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Article
Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination
LEA SHEPARD
Employers’ use of credit reports to evaluate prospective job applicants
has generated considerable scrutiny in the popular press and academic
literature, but few proposals for reform. This Article explores three
possible ways of reducing the risk of financial history discrimination in the
employment setting.
First, imposing inquiry limits on employers’ use of credit reports, a
policy recently adopted or under consideration in the majority of states, is
unlikely to be effective, since states’ inquiry limits are currently narrowly
drafted and therefore advance few anti-discriminatory objectives. In
addition, inquiry limits cannot prevent self-interested individuals from
voluntarily revealing their credit histories and other financial history
information, a shortcoming that triggers the game-theoretic “unraveling”
process. Second, most attempts to improve consumers’ participatory role
in employers’ evaluation processes can only superficially combat financial
history discrimination, since these efforts are likely to produce unreliable
information, and they may have a regressive impact.
Given the limitations of these options, the Article considers to what
extent a third approach—encouraging employers to use an empirically
derived, statistically sound evaluation method to scrutinize applicants—
can combat discrimination. Although an empirical method—an adaptation
of credit scoring methodologies for use by employers—is imperfect, it can
help to reduce the likelihood of implicit bias and stereotyping that is
inherent in employers’ current subjective analyses of the raw data in credit
reports. While antidiscrimination initiatives have traditionally focused on
withholding information from decision-makers, where suppression of
information is impracticable, the contrary approach may be more likely to
advance sustained reform efforts.
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Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination
LEA SHEPARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
A job seeker’s to-do list is extensive and laborious. He must complete
formal and informal education and job training programs, earning the
credentials necessary to achieve threshold competency in a given position.
He must research suitable job openings. He must update his résumé and
submit required paperwork, which highlight his strengths and
communicate succinctly to a prospective employer why the applicant is a
desirable candidate for a given position. He must prepare adequately for
one or more interviews. He must submit favorable references or letters of
recommendation to employers, which provide important endorsements
from the applicant’s past life.
A prudent job applicant must also complete an important step in
financial hygiene that he might otherwise overlook: a credit report1 check.
Because approximately sixty percent of employers consult applicants’
credit reports in making hiring decisions,2 a job applicant would be wise to
scrutinize his report in advance of an employer’s formal vetting process to
ensure that no information in the report is incomplete or inaccurate.3 An
*
Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School;
A.B., Duke University. I am grateful to Dan Krivinskas, Donna Krivinskas, Spencer Shepard IV, and
all attendees of the Washington University Junior Faculty Workshop for their helpful feedback. I am
also grateful to all attendees of the American Association of Law Schools Debtor-Creditor section’s
annual meeting for comments on my companion article. My library liaison, Patricia Scott, and my
research assistant, Hanah Harris, provided excellent research support.
1
Although this Article uses the terms “credit report” and “consumer report” interchangeably, the
former term is narrower than the latter. Protecting Consumers’ Data: Policy Issues Raised by
ChoicePoint, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 6–7 (2005) (statement of Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050315protectingconsume
rdata.pdf. The term “consumer report” refers collectively to all reports issued to both creditors and
non-creditors (e.g., insurers, employers, and landlords). Id. at 7 n.11.
2
Background Checking: Conducting Credit Background Checks, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCES
MGMT. slide 3 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/Backgro
undChecking.aspx [hereinafter Background Checking].
3
Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the federal statute that governs the use of credit
reports by creditors, employers, and insurers, consumers are entitled to a free copy of their consumer
report from each of the three nationwide consumer reporting agencies (Experian, Equifax, and Trans
Union) once every twelve months. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also Chereen Zaki, Want a
Job? Raise Your Credit Score, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chereenzaki/2012
/03/16/want-a-job-raise-your-credit-score (listing the three companies that provide the reports).
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applicant whose credit report reveals financial problems may seek to
improve his credit profile by correcting errors, paying down debts, or
settling delinquencies.4
Job applicants with adverse credit histories—those that reflect
collection actions, bankruptcies, or high debt-to-income ratios—are at a
competitive disadvantage. Employers are prone to make a multitude of
negative assumptions about such individuals: they are more likely to be
irresponsible,5 more likely to commit fraud or theft on the job,6 more
susceptible to bribery and blackmail,7 or more likely to be distracted by
financial worries or collection activity.8
Employers’ consideration of applicants’ financial histories has
generated significant doubts among scholars and legislators.9 These
4
See, e.g., Zaki, supra note 3 (describing ways to increase one’s credit score in order to improve
job prospects).
5
See, e.g., Vicious Cycle, BUCKS CTY. COURIER TIMES, Nov. 21, 2012, at A12 (“Ballooning
credit card balances, missed loan and bill payments, late charges and other penalties can make anybody
look like an irresponsible deadbeat. And, consequently, a risky hire.”); Heather Huhman, When
Employers Look into Your Credit History, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 22, 2011),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2011/07/22/when-employers-look-intoyour-credit-history (“Your credit report gives employers a sense of your responsibility level in your
personal life. If you haven’t done anything to improve your credit or continue to be irresponsible with
money, it’s a bad sign for employers looking to hire you.”).
6
See, e.g., Huhman, supra note 5 (“Some employers believe people with large debts or credit
problems could be more likely to steal or commit fraud, which organizations can’t afford, especially in
today’s down economy.”); Why Filing Bankruptcy Might Be the Worst Thing You Could Do for Your
Career, BUS. INSIDER (May 13, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-filing-bankruptcy-mightbe-the-worst-thing-you-could-do-for-your-career-2012-5 (explaining that employers consult applicants’
credit histories in part because credit checks “allow[] them to identify potential theft risks: Employees
with debts are among the most likely to steal from their employers”).
7
Sean Reilly, Personal Debt Sinks More Clearances, FED. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, at 1 (reporting
that many prospective federal employees with adverse financial backgrounds have been denied security
clearances, because a large debt load “could heighten someone’s vulnerability to bribery or
blackmail”).
8
See Brian M. Kalish, Freed from Financial Burden: Noninsurance Offerings Provide a Way to
Help Ease Employees’ Financial Stressors and Improve Workplace Productivity, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS,
Feb. 2013, at 28, 28 (citing study that concludes that financial difficulties increase employee
absenteeism and decrease employee productivity).
9
See, e.g., Loren W. Brown, Credit Report: An Acceptable Aid to the Hiring Decision?, 39 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2011) (discussing the effectiveness of credit report use in the employment setting
and observing that although reports may seem useful to employers, no definitive studies establish that
they predict employee behavior); Roberto Concepción, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks:
Effectuating Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities Under the Guise of Job-Relatedness and Business
Necessity, 12 SCHOLAR 523, 535–41 (2010) (questioning whether credit histories reflect traits relevant
to job success); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1695, 1722–43 (2012) (conducting a normative assessment of the merits of credit report use by
employers); Deborah Thorne, Personal Bankruptcy and the Credit Report: Conflicting Mechanisms of
Social Mobility, 11 J. POVERTY, No. 4, 2008, at 23, 27–28, 41–42 (describing credit reports as
impeding the upward social mobility otherwise triggered by a bankruptcy filing); Ruth Desmond,
Comment, Consumer Credit Reports and Privacy in the Employment Context: The Fair Credit
Reporting Act and the Equal Employment for All Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 910–13 (2010)
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commentators have questioned whether a valid correlation exists between
adverse financial histories and employees’ job performance.10 Some have
also expressed concerns that the practice, although intended to promote
debt-repayment, may have an adverse effect on social mobility and racial
equality.11 Others have populist misgivings that the use of credit reports in
the employment setting compounds the economic pain of consumers
recovering from a financial crisis for which many disparate actors share
blame.12
Although employers’ use of consumer reports has generated helpful
normative critiques, few have critically evaluated possible solutions to the
problems triggered by the practice. In this timely companion piece to my
normative analysis of financial history discrimination,13 I address this
important gap in the scholarly literature. I evaluate three divergent ways of
reducing the risk of financial history discrimination in the employment
setting: (1) banning the use of consumer reports; (2) giving applicants a
greater voice in employers’ assessment processes, consistent with rights
afforded to consumers in analogous settings; and (3) encouraging
employers to use an empirically derived, statistically sound method to
evaluate applicants’ credit histories.
States’ primary response to the threat of financial history
discrimination has been to attempt to ban the use of credit reports in the
hiring process.14 I argue that although bans reflect a seemingly robust
(describing how credit reports both benefit employers and contribute to discrimination); Kelly
Gallagher, Note, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting Act: When Requesting Credit Reports for
“Employment Purposes” Goes Too Far, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1604–07 (2006) (detailing how
employers’ use of credit reports perpetuate discrimination and harm poorer applicants).
10
See, e.g., AMY TRAUB , D MOS, D ISCREDITED : HOW E MPLOYMENT C REDIT C HECKS KEEP
QUALIFIED
WORKERS
OUT
OF
A
JOB
14
(2013)
available
at
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Discredited-Demos.pdf (“[T]here is little or
no evidence that any data on personal credit history is relevant to employment . . . .”).
11
See, e.g., id. at Executive Summary (“African American and Latino households have worse
credit, on average, than white households.
As a result, employment credit checks may
disproportionately screen people of color out of jobs, leading to discriminatory hiring.”).
12
See, e.g., Saki Knafo, How Bad Credit Reports Keep People Unemployed, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar.
6,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/04/bad-credit-reportsunemployment_n_2807939.html (“[T]he debts incurred during the recession have prevented people
from getting back on their feet and paying back what they owe, trapping them in a vicious cycle of debt
and unemployment.”).
13
See generally Shepard, supra note 9, at 1722 38 (discussing how employers’ consideration of
financial histories impacts debt-repayment incentives, social mobility, and racial equality).
14
At the time of this writing, eight states—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—have passed laws restricting employers’ use of consumer reports.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West Supp. 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51tt (2013); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 378-2(a)(8) (2011); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10 (West Supp. 2013); MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (2011); 21 VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020 (West 2013).
Seventeen more states and the District of Columbia are considering adopting similar legislation. Use of
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response to the risk of financial history discrimination, they are unlikely to
be effective. First, state laws in their current form are narrowly drafted
and, as a result, make few changes to the status quo. Thus, these
restrictions advance few anti-discriminatory objectives. Second, even if
these laws were more broadly drafted and vigorously enforced, they could
not easily prevent individuals from voluntarily disclosing their financial
histories to employers, a shortcoming that triggers the game-theoretic
“unraveling” process.
As Douglas Baird, Scott Peppet, and other scholars of game theory
have observed, in situations in which asymmetric information exists
between two parties, an individual who holds favorable verifiable
information has an incentive to reveal that information to an uninformed
party.15 In the employment setting, those applicants with the strongest
financial histories—those that reflect no adverse events like bankruptcy
filings or debt-collection actions—are likely to reveal their financial
history information to employers in order to gain a competitive advantage.
If these self-interested actors disclose their financial history information
for personal or economic gain, other applicants—including those with less
favorable financial histories—in turn will be compelled to make similar
disclosures, since those who fail to disclose will be penalized.16 If an
applicant fails to reveal her credit score or credit history, either overtly or
through information “signaling,”17 an employer will infer that the applicant
is withholding negative information.18 Faced with the choice between
disclosure and the stigma associated with failure to disclose, an applicant
will choose to reveal her financial history. This Article argues that the
strong likelihood of unraveling—made more acute by rights afforded to
applicants under consumer-protection laws and by developments in
information technology—promises to disrupt states’ enforcement of
financial history bans.
Credit Information in Employment 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-info-in-employ-2012-legis.aspx
(last
updated Mar. 6, 2013).
15
E.g., DOUGLAS G. B AIRD , R OBERT H. GERTNER & R ANDAL C. P ICKER , GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 90–91 (1994); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the
Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW . U. L. R EV. 1153, 1177 (2011).
16
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1176 77 (“Eventually, even those with the worst private
information . . . may realize that they have little choice but to disclose to avoid the stigma of keeping
information secret.”).
17
Applicants can “signal” the strength of their financial backgrounds to prospective employers
through various proxies instead of formally disclosing their credit histories. Id. at 1162. For example,
an applicant could signal the absence of student loan debt (and, therefore, the likely absence of any
student loan delinquencies) by disclosing that she received a scholarship that covered all or the vast
majority of her educational expenses. See infra notes 149 54 and accompanying text.
18
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1176 (stating that as disclosure becomes the norm, “keeping one’s
personal prospectus private may become suspect”).
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As an alternative to restricting employers’ use of applicants’ credit
histories, policymakers could pursue a more nuanced approach and attempt
to give applicants a greater participatory role in employers’ assessment
processes. Policymakers could institutionalize and expand a right that
some employers already claim to give select applicants: the right to explain
to an employer the circumstances that may have contributed to an adverse
financial event like a bankruptcy filing or a debt-collection action.19 I refer
to this right as the “Mitigation Opportunity.” I consider how the
Mitigation Opportunity could be enhanced consistent with similar rights
consumers enjoy in analogous settings: in the context of creditors’ and
insurers’ consideration of credit histories.20
Expanding the Mitigation Opportunity seemingly provides an
individualized approach to an otherwise bureaucratic and impersonal
assessment method. It gives some credence to the “situationist” account of
human behavior endorsed by behavioral realists—an approach that
recognizes that “unseen or unappreciated influences” within individuals
and in society heavily influence individuals’ actions and circumstances.21
I argue, however, that most attempts to improve consumers’
participatory role in employers’ evaluation processes can only superficially
combat financial history discrimination. Because applicants’ explanations
for adverse financial events are largely subjective and not easily verified,
they would likely have little impact on employers’ decision-making
processes. Likewise, even if employers were required to consider
applicants’ explanations,22 those applicants who can provide the most
convincing explanations to employers are not necessarily more deserving
of special treatment. Rather, those individuals are more likely to be
financially literate and financially sophisticated. In other words, requiring
employers to consider candidates’ explanations can have a regressive
impact on employers’ evaluation processes.23
While increasing consumers’ participatory role will not benefit
applicants, such a reform would likely benefit employers in a pragmatic
sense. By taking steps to increase the perceived legitimacy and procedural
fairness of using credit histories, employers can opportunistically forestall
19

See infra Part IV.A.
Creditors use credit scores to quantify the credit risk posed by a prospective or current
borrower. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. Insurers use insurance scores (which are derived
from credit reporting data) to estimate the number or total cost of insurance claims that prospective
policyholders are likely to file. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
21
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of
Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 E MORY L.J. 311, 314 (2008).
22
Some insurers who use credit data in setting insurance rates must consider whether prospective
policyholders’ credit histories were influenced by extraordinary life events. See infra notes 179 80 and
accompanying text.
23
See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
20
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regulation by reducing the likelihood that lawmakers would, in response to
public complaints, ban the practice altogether.24
Given the limitations of banning employers’ consideration of
applicants’ financial histories and of increasing applicants’ participatory
role in employers’ assessment processes, this Article considers an
alternative.
It explores the possibility that a third, somewhat
counterintuitive approach—encouraging employers to use an empirically
derived, statistically sound evaluation method—can more realistically
combat discrimination.
Currently, employers use only the raw data in consumer reports to
make assessments about applicants. They do not use credit scores.25 In
other words, employers infer from applicants’ personal information,
payment history, and public record information whether applicants possess
certain personality traits important to success in the workplace.26
Likewise, employers do not commit in advance to the criteria by which
applicants’ credit reports will be measured. As a result, employers’ current
assessment methods can yield idiosyncratic and subjective decisions about
applicants. Indeed, employers’ current evaluation techniques, I argue, are
analogous to the “judgmental” underwriting techniques used by creditors
before the widespread adoption of credit scores in the 1970s and 1980s.27
Judgmental underwriting has been known to generate inaccurate,
inconsistent, and discriminatory decision making.28
Some of the problems caused by employers’ current assessment
methods could be alleviated if employers instead adopted an empirical
approach—one analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores and insurers’
use of credit-based insurance scores. In other words, just as creditors use
credit data to evaluate an applicant’s creditworthiness and insurers use
credit histories to price insurance policies, employers could use applicants’
credit information to measure whether, in fact, financial histories are
predictive of personality traits relevant to job performance (including, for
example, conscientiousness and responsibility).
An employment scoring model will not eliminate discrimination;
indeed, the practice could have a disproportionately adverse impact on
24

See infra notes 182 84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 54 55 and accompanying text.
26
See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7 (presenting results of employer poll on credit
report use and describing the information that is most likely to affect an employer’s decision to not
extend a job offer).
27
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT
SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT, at O-4 (2007)
[hereinafter FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING] (“Before the introduction of credit scoring, the
evaluation of creditworthiness was conducted manually and judgmentally by loan officers relying
primarily on experience and subjective assessments of credit risk.”).
28
See, e.g., id. at 36 (noting that judgmental underwriting “offers opportunities for discriminatory
behavior”).
25

2014]

SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO FINANCIAL HISTORY DISCRIMINATION

1001

29

racial minorities.
In spite of these problems, the practice has several
distinct advantages that legislators should consider in assessing the threat
of financial history discrimination in the employment setting. First, it
would reduce the likelihood of implicit bias and stereotyping that
psychological research demonstrates is inherent in employers’ current
subjective analyses of the raw data in consumer reports. Because
employers would be required to commit to those criteria by which they
measure an applicant’s employment “risk,” an empirical approach can
increase consistency and reduce the likelihood that employers would
deviate—consciously or unconsciously—from the statistically validated
results generated by an employment scoring algorithm.
Most importantly, adoption of an employment scoring system can
address the most compelling criticism of employers’ current evaluation
methods: there exists inadequate evidence establishing a correlation
between applicants’ credit history and traits relevant to job performance.
As I discuss in my earlier article on the normative implications of
employers’ use of credit reports, existing research fails to persuasively
establish that financial histories are, in fact, predictive of behaviors
important to success in the workplace.30 A statistical scoring method
would help ensure that employers consider only those credit history
variables that are correlated at a statistically significant level with
observable, discrete traits, like conscientiousness and responsibility.31
A statistical approach, at first blush, seems to conflict with the goals of
antidiscrimination law, since it promotes, rather than restricts, access to a
controversial source of data. Many efforts to reduce the risk of
discrimination in the employment setting have attempted to deprive
decision-makers of certain types of information.32 This Article argues,
however, that to the extent suppression of information is impracticable, an
empirical method may be a more realistic way to advance key antidiscriminatory objectives.

29
In other words, because minorities and other protected groups have lower credit scores than
non-minorities, an employment scoring model—which would likely incorporate some of the same
credit scoring variables—could have a “disparate impact” on racial minorities, a violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See infra Part V.B.3.
30
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1711 18 (discussing the merits, or lack thereof, of the Fraud
Hypothesis and Responsibility Hypothesis).
31
See infra Part V.B.1.
32
See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 16 (2000) (describing how American orchestras have required
auditioning musicians to play behind opaque screens to reduce sex discrimination); Employer Access to
Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx
(last updated Sept. 12, 2013) (reporting that thirty-six states are considering adopting legislation that
would prevent employers from requesting passwords to personal Internet accounts).
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes employers’
rationales for consulting applicants’ credit reports and summarizes the
normative complications posed by this practice.33 Part III discusses the
limitations of states’ predominant approach to the risk of financial history
discrimination: banning employers’ consideration of credit histories. Part
IV explores the benefits of giving consumers a greater voice in employers’
assessment processes. Finally, Part V evaluates the merits of an alternative
solution: encouraging employers to adopt a statistical method of
evaluating applicants, analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores and
insurers’ use of credit-based insurance scores. While employment
screening methods have long been a subject of focus in the academic
literature,34 this Article contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on the
effects of “Big Data” on the future of antidiscrimination policy.35
This Article acknowledges that an endorsement of an empirical
decision-making process rests on completely different normative
assumptions from those underlying states’ attempts to ban the use of
financial history information in the employment setting. Bans on the use
of credit reports and other financial history information presume that
employers’ consultation of credit reports either cannot achieve its
predictive objective, or that the merits of the practice are outweighed by
important countervailing considerations. The adoption of a statistical
33
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1722 38 (noting that serious complications include continuing
racial inequality, social immobility, and the suppression of wages).
34
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Elinor P. Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening,
59 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1003 04 (1981) (investigating the problems related to employment
discrimination that occur when employers adopt “novel risk-oriented hiring screens”); Stewart Schwab,
Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228, 233 (1986) (arguing that statistical
discrimination may not be very efficient); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1619 (1991)
(discussing whether changes in society’s view of race should affect understanding of federal
employment discrimination laws); Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting
Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1409 (1979)
(examining “the tangled objections and ambivalent reactions to particular prediction methods, and to
the process of” predicting an applicant’s future behavior); Nathan J. Ebnet, Note, It Can Do More than
Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-Employment Screening with the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 306, 308 09 (2012) (arguing “that FCRA compliant third-party social
media screening appropriately balances the privacy interests of job applicants with the information
appetite of employers,” and recommending “that all social media screening should be formalized”).
35
See, e.g., SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION
26–27 (David Lyon ed., 2003) (describing the potential for harm when individuals’ personal
information is used to sort them into categories); Jerry Kang et al., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 809, 847 (2012) (recommending the creation of a new profession of Privacy Data Guardians
who would manage Privacy Data Vaults); Peppet, supra note 15, at 1153 56 (listing and then
discussing the impact of technology on individuals’ lives, including the availability of a service that
allows individuals to “digitally divulge pre-verified information” to potential employers); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW . U. L.
R EV. 1667, 1668 70 (2008) (examining the changes in information economics and suggesting that the
law should respond to those changes).
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evaluation method, in contrast, presumes the precise opposite: credit
reports can, in fact, be used to predict counterproductive work behaviors,
and the merits of the practice are not overshadowed by political or ethical
complications. This Article does not claim to reconcile this tension or to
resolve these normative uncertainties.
The dilemma this Article explores is different. This Article argues that
legislative efforts to restrict the use of credit reporting information may
fail, regardless of whether financial histories are a valid measurement of
important personality traits, and regardless of whether countervailing
normative considerations justify the suppression of this information. Thus,
this Article considers the information-management tensions that legislators
must address in the nascent “Big Data” economy. It attempts to elucidate
the benefits and drawbacks of a variety of prescriptive solutions to the risk
of financial history discrimination, given the acute risk that what may be
perceived as the most robust and risk-averse solution cannot in practice
provide the antidiscrimination protection that advocates seek. This
analysis does not reflect a normative concession, so much as a pragmatic
recognition that laws often do not achieve their desired objectives and that
policymakers must frequently act in spite of normative ambiguity.
II. THE INCREASE IN “OFF-LABEL” USE OF CREDIT REPORTS BY
EMPLOYERS, INSURERS, AND LICENSING ORGANIZATIONS
The most common and traditional use of credit reports has been by
creditors, who consult these databases to decide whether applicants are
qualified for mortgages, credit cards, and other credit products.36 Credit
reports reduce the information asymmetries between consumers and
creditors by allowing creditors to assess an otherwise anonymous
consumer’s “creditworthiness” and to price credit products accordingly.37
Creditors’ longstanding use of credit reports is an example of the nation’s
increasing reliance on “Big Data”—an evolution in data aggregation and
assimilation that is changing the way economic actors process and respond
to information.38

36
See Loretta J. Mester, What’s the Point of Credit Scoring?, BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 3,
3 4 (providing background information on what credit scoring is and describing its primary use in
helping lenders make better informed decisions).
37
Robert M. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit Reporting in America
4–5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 02-21, 2002), available at
http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/wp02-21.pdf.
38
See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 686 (2013) (“Data aggregation,
analysis, retrieval, and transmission by computers on grand scales, collectively and colloquially
referred to as Big Data, are changing the way we process information, what we learn from that
information, and how we behave based on that information.”).
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Consumer reports contain abundant information about every American
adult’s personal and financial background.39 Reports list an individual’s
(1) personal information (e.g., address and employment history);40 (2)
payment history (i.e., record of loan repayment);41 (3) inquiry history (i.e.,
a list of those who have recently accessed a consumer’s report);42 and
(4) public record information (e.g., bankruptcies and foreclosures).43
Credit reporting agencies—more commonly known as “credit bureaus”44—
use these raw data to generate an applicant’s “credit score”—a
quantification of the credit risk posed by a prospective or current
borrower.45
Over the last several decades, however, credit reports have
increasingly been used for many “off-label” purposes.46 Today, insurers,
employers, landlords, and licensing organizations regularly access
individuals’ credit histories.47 Unlike creditors, these entities generally use
credit data to make inferences not about these individuals’ likelihood of
repaying particular debts,48 but about their personal behaviors and
propensities.49 Insurers, for example, use credit histories to generate
credit-based insurance scores, which they in turn use as a factor in
39
ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 4.1, at
83 (5th ed. 2002) (“The three major agencies will have a file on virtually every adult American . . . .”).
40
Personal information includes a consumer’s name, address, Social Security number, date of
birth, previous address, employer, and phone number. EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES & CREDIT
REPORTS: HOW THE SYSTEM REALLY WORKS: WHAT YOU CAN DO 81–82 (2d ed. 2005).
41
Payment history details a consumer’s record of repayment on her mortgage, auto loans,
installment loans, credit cards, and department store cards. Id. at 19.
42
“Inquiries” refer to those employers and creditors who have requested a consumer’s credit
report within the last two years for employment purposes and within the last year for any other purpose.
CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
§ 3.2.3.2, at 75 (7th ed. 2010).
43
Public record information includes tax liens, bankruptcies, court judgments, and foreclosures.
Id.
44
The term “consumer reporting agency” is broader than the term “credit bureau.” A consumer
reporting agency encompasses “credit bureaus” and other entities that do not specialize in reporting
consumer credit information to prospective creditors. Id. § 1.2.1, at 4. “Consumer reporting agencies”
include tenant screening bureaus and employment screening agencies. Id.
45
FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at S-1.
46
See Katie Porter, More Supreme Court Action on Credit Issues, CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 28, 2006)
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/09/more_supreme_co.html (discussing how insurance
companies use credit reports to make underwriting decisions).
47
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1696, 1705 06 (providing examples of non-credit uses of
consumer reports).
48
E.g., FED. TRADE C OMM ’N , C REDIT -B ASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON
C ONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 2 (2007) [hereinafter FED. TRADE C OMM’N ,
INSURANCE ], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_CreditBased_Insurance_Scores.pdf (explaining that insurers do not use credit-based insurance scores to
predict payment behavior, such as whether premiums will be paid).
49
Landlords may, however, use credit reports in part to determine if a prospective tenant is
financially stable. Trinise L. Castro, What Do Landlords Look for on a Credit Check?, SFGATE.COM,
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/landlords-look-credit-check-2732.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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estimating the number or total cost of insurance claims that prospective
policyholders may file.50 Likewise, some licensing organizations attempt
to infer from credit reports whether prospective licensees are likely to
exhibit self-restraint and observe the law. For example, a state bar
examiner might attempt to deduce whether an applicant who has
significant student loan debt and who is the subject of numerous collection
actions is likely to steal a client’s property.51
It is now standard practice for employers to consult applicants’ credit
histories in making hiring decisions. Employer surveys indicate that sixty
percent of employers used credit reports in 2010, compared to thirty-five
percent of employers in 2003, and nineteen percent in 1996.52 Employers
and licensing organizations use applicants’ consumer reports for two
primary reasons: (1) to predict whether an applicant is likely to steal from
customers, co-workers, or clients (which I refer to as the “Fraud
Hypothesis”); and (2) to measure an applicant’s level of financial
responsibility, which employers in turn interpret as an indication of his or
her capacity to serve as a responsible employee or licensee (which I refer
to as the “Responsibility Hypothesis”).53
Significantly, employers do not have access to the credit scores
generated by credit reporting agencies.54 Because credit reporting agencies
use credit scoring algorithms for specific credit-related purposes (to
predict, for example, an applicant’s likelihood of repaying a thirty-year
fixed mortgage), credit reporting agencies refuse to provide employers
with credit scores, which are not necessarily reflective of the risks posed
by a job applicant.55 Instead, employers—like licensing organizations—
50

FED. T RADE C OMM’ N , INSURANCE , supra note 48, at 2.
See Lori E. Shaw, What Does It Take to Satisfy Character and Fitness Requirements?, 37
STUDENT L. 12, 14 (2008) (discussing debt as a general issue for bar examiners). One bar examiner
articulated this concern as follows:
51

I think the concern ultimately centers around the issue of protection of the public.
Before admitting someone to the bar, I believe that the members of Character and
Fitness Committees want to be sure that the financial pressures on a new lawyer will
not be such that the lawyer will be tempted to take advantage of a client . . . .
Id.
52
SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CREDIT
BACKGROUND CHECKS SHRM POLL 3 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings
/Articles/Pages/BackgroundChecking.aspx.
53
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1711–18 (defining the two hypotheses and describing their use by
employers).
54
See Leslie Callaway & Mark Kruhm, Servicemember Disclosure a Must on All Mortgages, 102
AM. BANKERS ASS’N BANKING J. 64, 64 (2010) (“Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion all decline to
provide credit scores to employers for employment screening.”).
55
See id. (explaining that consumer reporting agencies refuse to provide credit reports to
employers because employers lack a “legitimate business need” for accessing this information). As I
have previously argued, however, both credit scores as well as raw credit history data may be
insufficiently predictive of personality traits that are relevant to workplace performance. See Shepard,

1006

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:993

attempt to infer from the raw data on credit reports whether a given
applicant reflects a good employment “risk.” For example, an employer
might presume that a candidate’s spotty repayment history and her recent
bankruptcy filing predispose her to fraud, absenteeism, or distractedness.
Employers’ increased interest in consumer reports as a vetting tool has
been fueled by several factors. In competitive job markets, when large
numbers of applicants vie for limited positions, employers seek additional
ways to sort through applications efficiently.56 Employers can cull large
numbers of applicants based on the presence of a bankruptcy, a collection
action, or evidence of excessive debt on a consumer report.57
Likewise, employers’ use of consumer reports has been fueled by
prospective and former employers’ fear of tort liability. Prospective
employers are concerned that if they fail to carefully consider applicants’
backgrounds, then they will expose themselves to negligent hiring
lawsuits.58 Employers are frequently admonished that failure to conduct a
thorough background check on a prospective employee—including a credit
report check—can have serious legal and financial ramifications.59 Those
who defend employers’ use of credit reports claim, for example, that onethird of all corporate bankruptcies are a direct result of employee theft—a
problem that could be averted through a proper background review.60
supra note 9, at 1707 n.65 (explaining that credit bureaus do not share scores because they are
“designed specifically for lending and not for other purposes”).
56
See Desmond, supra note 9, at 907 08 (stating that the recent recession has created a job
market favoring employers and that employers are using credit checks as part of a “pre-employment
screening” process); Why Filing Bankruptcy Might Be the Worst Thing You Could Do for Your Career,
supra note 6 (explaining that employers’ use of credit reports “helps companies weed through huge
application pools with relative quickness”).
57
Employers claim not to use credit reports to pre-screen job applicants. See Christine V.
Walters, Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Statement at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Meeting: Employer Use of Credit History as a Screening Tool (Oct. 20, 2010), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/walter.cfm (citing a survey in which a majority of
employers reported that they used credit checks selectively at the end of the hiring process—not to
screen early-stage applicants). One recruiter, however, recalls the experience differently. See Trevor
Hughes, Shaky Credit Reports Could Hurt Job Applicants; Seven State Legislatures Act to Limit Hiring
Requirement, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2012, at 2B (reporting that companies’ hiring managers would
request that the recruiter exclude from consideration those applicants who had recently filed for
bankruptcy).
58
Shepard, supra note 9, at 1720 21.
59
See Tom Ahearn, Avoiding Negligent Hiring with Background Checks Explained in Interactive
Webinar
on
February
6,
EMP.
SCREENING
RES.
(Jan.
28,
2013),
http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2013/01/28/avoiding-negligent-hiring-with-background-checksexplained-in-interactive-webinar-on-february-6/ (“Even after the most diligent candidate selection
process, hiring someone without conducting a thorough background check can lead to major legal and
financial ramifications for a company. If new hires are dishonest about education, employment or
criminal history, employers could face the burden of having unqualified workers or even violent
employees in their offices.” (quoting Lester S. Rosen, Founder and CEO of Employment Screening
Resources) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
60
“Job Killer” Bill Banning Credit Report Use for Employment Passes Senate Fiscal Committee,
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Former employers’ concerns about tort exposure may also indirectly
place pressure on prospective employers to consult applicants’ credit
reports. Prospective employers frequently seek background information
about a job applicant by contacting the applicant’s references—a
seemingly high quality source of information about an applicant’s
performance in previous positions. Because, however, former employers
are fearful of defamation suits, they are frequently reluctant to make candid
evaluations of previous employees.61 Instead, many previous employers
provide only cursory and superficial assessments.62 Thus, because
prospective employers may be unable to acquire more relevant information
from applicants’ references, they feel forced to resort to less accurate, but
more easily accessible, information.63 Employers, for example, may more
readily consult consumer reports, Facebook profiles, and other websites
revealed in Google searches.64 This development is consistent with
screening theory, which posits that if a “desired characteristic is
unobservable, an uninformed party will filter counterparties based on what
observable characteristics or information is available.”65
Finally, as I discuss below, credit reports have grown more appealing
to employers as a result of developments in consumer protection laws and
advances in information technology.66 Both have increased consumers’
access to and control over the information in their reports, thereby
increasing credit reports’ real or perceived accuracy.67 Although consumer

CALCHAMBER
(Aug.
17,
2011),
http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/08172011jobkillerbillbanningcreditreportuseforemploymentpassessenatefiscalcommittee.aspx
(“The
U.S.
Chamber of Commerce estimates that a third of all corporate bankruptcies are a direct result of
employee theft. Accordingly, all employers need the ability to obtain and review the objective
information provided in an employee credit report . . . .”).
61
See, e.g., Natalie A. Simon, Long-Term Care at Home: Employing Caregivers, in 1 ESTATE
PLANNING FOR THE AGING OR INCAPACITATED CLIENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 10-1, 10-3 (Donald N.
Freedman & Emily S. Starr eds., 2012) (explaining that prospective employers cannot trust most
references, since former employers—fearful of defamation or breach of privacy suits—are likely to
provide only a perfunctory assessment and may even conceal negative information about the former
employee).
62
Id.
63
See id. (explaining that, absent reliable references, prospective employers must resort to
publicly available information about the job applicant, credit checks, and other sources).
64
See Thirty-Seven Percent of Companies Use Social Networks to Research Potential Job
Candidates, According to New CareerBuilder Survey, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/thirty-seven-percent-of-companies-use-social-networks-toresearch-potential-job-candidates-according-to-new-careerbuilder-survey-147885445.html
(“Employers [who reported using social networking screening] are primarily using Facebook (65
percent) and LinkedIn (63 percent) to research candidates; 16 percent use Twitter.”).
65
Peppet, supra note 15, at 1161.
66
See infra notes 123–29 and accompanying text.
67
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit
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reporting agencies continue to report a significant amount of erroneous
information,68 consumers’ increased access to their credit reports—coupled
with laws that allow consumers to correct errors and omissions—have
substantially shifted the onus of information-verification to consumers.69
As a result of consumers’ participation in this vetting process, employers
may feel more comfortable relying on credit histories as evaluative tools.
In my earlier article, I examine the normative considerations
underlying employers’ use of credit reports. I briefly summarize these
political, ethical, and economic arguments below. Although this Article’s
emphasis is on the information-management implications of various policy
proposals, the utility of these prescriptions can be measured, at least in
part, by how well they negotiate these competing considerations. I discuss
three important normative issues here: (1) the promotion of debt
repayment; (2) the empirical validity of employers’ use of financial
histories; and (3) the effect of the practice on racial equality and social
mobility.
First, it is possible that employers’ consideration of financial histories
serves a useful deterrent function. Debt default—especially bankruptcy—
is perceived by many as an evasion of one’s financial obligations, the costs
of which are externalized in the form of increased interest rates and a
decreased availability of credit.70 For this reason, many employers who
use credit reports as a vetting tool may choose not to hire applicants who
have filed for bankruptcy or defaulted on a certain type of financial
obligation. In this way, employers’ use of credit reports operates as a
deterrent to debt default—one that supplements existing legal penalties.71
It is possible that employers’ use of financial histories, by penalizing
candidates who have failed to repay their debts, serves a salutary economic
function by encouraging debtors to reconcile with their creditors.72
Alternatively, however, employers’ and licensing organizations’
consideration of financial histories may create incentives for applicants to
. . . in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the . . . accuracy . . . of such
information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.”).
68
See, e.g., FED. TRADE C OMM’N , R EPORT TO C ONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR
AND ACCURATE C REDIT TRANSACTIONS A CT OF 2003, at i (2012) [hereinafter FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FACTA], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130211factareport.pdf (reporting that
twenty-six percent of consumers in a study found one or more “potentially material error[s]” on at least
one of their credit reports).
69
See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
70
See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 171 (2005) (“Voluntary creditors presumably pass most, if not all, of
[the initial burden of bankruptcy relief] along to current or future debtors in the form of higher interest
rates. To the extent that they do, the effect of bankruptcy protection is to increase the cost of credit to
individuals and/or reduce its availability in the economy in general.”).
71
Shepard, supra note 9, at 1723.
72
Id. at 1727.
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reduce their productivity levels, which can trigger costs borne by
taxpayers, dependents, and others.73
Second, many who question the wisdom and ethics of employers’ use
of credit reports contend that the practice lacks empirical support.74 In
other words, it is unclear whether or to what extent credit reports are, in
fact, predictive of personality traits relevant to job performance. I have
previously argued that there is little to no evidence to support the Fraud
Hypothesis and only limited evidence to support the Responsibility
Hypothesis.75 For instance, many of the studies that have been used to
justify the Fraud Hypothesis employ flawed methodologies. These studies
report that individuals who have committed financial crimes have
experienced financial stress.76 Because, however, it is unclear what
percentage of all employees experiencing financial stress refrain from
committing theft or fraud, these studies do not establish a general
correlation between financial stress and propensity to commit financial
crimes.77 In other words, researchers lack a representative sample of
employees or job applicants.
While additional studies attempt to assess the relationship between
financial history and counterproductive work behaviors, none persuasively
demonstrate a correlation between the two variables.78 For example, in
attempting to measure the correlation between certain negative work habits
and adverse financial histories, many studies have relied on self-reported
data,79 which may or may not be reflective of an applicant’s credit history
as interpreted by an employer.80 Studies that rely on applicants’ credit
scores are likewise problematic, since employers do not use credit scores in

73

Id. at 1727–28.
See, e.g., Jeremy B. Bernerth et al., An Empirical Investigation of Dispositional Antecedents
and Performance-Related Outcomes of Credit Scores, 97 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 469, 469 (2012)
(“Despite the claims of practitioners and credit reporting agencies, there exists virtually no empirical
evidence to confirm or refute the proposed antecedents and outcomes of credit scores. Such a lack of
evidence presents a problem for organizations using credit scores to screen employees . . . .”).
75
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1711–18 (discussing the evidence supporting the two hypotheses).
76
ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM., REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND
ABUSE 5 (2010), available at http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/r
ttn-2010.pdf (reporting that in forty-three percent of occupational fraud cases studied, perpetrators were
“living beyond their means,” and in thirty-six percent of these cases, perpetrators were experiencing
financial difficulties).
77
Shepard, supra note 9, at 1713.
78
Id.
79
See, e.g., Edward S. Oppler et al., The Relationship Between Financial History and
Counterproductive Work Behavior, 16 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 417 (2008) (relying on a
questionnaire in which job applicants self-report certain adverse financial events).
80
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1716 (“[Employers] have access only to specific lists of financial
events . . . . As a result, employers might process these raw data very differently (and far less
consistently) than do consumer reporting agencies’ algorithms.”).
74
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81

their evaluation processes. As a result, these studies’ outcomes are not
necessarily applicable to real-world uses of credit reports by employers.
Even if employers’ use of credit reports lacks empirical support,
however, some might question why, in effect, employers should bear the
onus of establishing the practice’s predictive validity. Under this view,
applicants—and not employers—should bear the burden of proving that
credit reports do not predict one’s likelihood of serving as a responsible
employee or engaging in fraud or theft. Absent evidence negating the
practice’s validity, and absent successful Title VII challenges, employers
arguably should have the right to consider all facially relevant information.
Third, many contend that, even if credit reports can validly and reliably
predict a prospective employee’s merits, the benefits of employers’ use of
credit reports are outweighed by important countervailing considerations.
Specifically, the use of credit reports in the employment setting may have a
deleterious impact on racial and economic equality.82
Although the practice is facially neutral and appears to affect all
applicants even-handedly, employers’ use of credit reports likely has a
disparate impact on racial minorities.83 Because there is a strong
correlation between race and credit score,84 the practice may perpetuate
discrimination by reinforcing racial disparities in the allocation of jobs—
resources that are indispensable to an individual’s identity, personal
dignity, and financial independence.85
Relatedly, many have expressed concern that the use of credit histories
can adversely affect social mobility.86 Because income and credit history
are positively correlated, employers who scrutinize applicants’ financial
backgrounds may be unwittingly impairing poorer individuals’ ability to
ascend to positions of higher status and wealth.87 Similarly, because
applicants with adverse financial histories suffer a competitive
disadvantage in the hiring process, the practice may place downward
pressure on poorer applicants’ wages, thereby perpetuating income
disparities.88 The practice may also present a more symbolic challenge to
social mobility by signaling to consumers that their financial decisions
81

Id.
See id. at 1729–33 (discussing the disparities between the credit scores of minorities and nonminorities and the impact on minorities when employers make hiring decisions based in part on the
financial histories of applicants).
83
Id. at 1730.
84
Id. at 1730–31.
85
See id. at 1700 (noting that philosopher Anthony Appiah described the pursuit of a career as “a
resource that [is] . . . ‘essential to a dignified autonomous life’” (quoting K. Anthony Appiah,
Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 41, 46 (2000))).
86
See id. at 1734–38 (“[E]mployers’ and licensing organizations’ use of financial histories
[prompts concerns] that the practice poses an affront to social mobility.”).
87
Id. at 1734–35.
88
Id. at 1735–36.
82
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have serious collateral ramifications—ones that extend far beyond the
realm of access to and cost of credit.89 Employers’ use of credit reports
teaches consumers that late payments or debt-collection actions can result
in far more than a mere increase in a consumer’s interest rate or the
imposition of various fees. Significantly, these adverse financial events
can complicate a consumer’s pursuit of a job or a profession.90
In the next Part, I examine how legislators have overwhelmingly
responded to these normative and empirical uncertainties: by attempting to
ban employers’ use of credit reports in the evaluation process. While this
approach may appear especially politically palatable in the aftermath of the
Great Recession, and while it seemingly reflects the most risk-averse
solution, I argue that suppression of information may be infeasible in a
society and era in which data aggregation and dissemination pose
unprecedented challenges to consumer privacy and to antidiscrimination
policy.
III. STATES’ PREVAILING RESPONSE TO THE RISK OF
FINANCIAL HISTORY DISCRIMINATION: INQUIRY LIMITS
Legislators’ primary response to the risk of financial history
discrimination has been to restrict employers’ inquiry into and use of
Currently, eight states—California,
applicants’ credit history.91
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington—and several major cities have passed laws restricting
employers’ use of consumer reports.92 Other states are considering similar
legislation.93
Conceptually, inquiry limits may provide the most politically palatable
and logical response to many normative concerns about employers’ use of
financial histories in the hiring process. Because of the empirical
uncertainty about credit reports’ ability to validly predict either
89
See id. at 1736–38 (“It is also possible that the practice’s most direct affront to social mobility
stems from its deterrent and symbolic role, suggesting that the goals of debt repayment and social
mobility are in tension with one another.”).
90
See id. at 1759 (noting that a stronger antidiscrimination rule “can reduce those barriers that
may inevitably complicate the search for a new job or career”).
91
See id. at 1697–98 (“Legislators and policymakers have questioned the logic and ethics of
employers’ and licensing organizations’ two primary uses of financial histories . . . . Some federal and
state legislators have sought to limit employers’ consideration of applicants’ credit histories absent a
reasonably clear relationship between the applicant’s financial transgression and his or her ability to
perform the responsibilities demanded by the position.”).
92
See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Bans are also either in effect or are being considered
in Chicago, Illinois; Hartford, Connecticut; New York, New York; and Washington, D.C. CHI., ILL.
MUN. CODE § 2-160-053 (2012); HARTFORD, CONN. MUN. CODE § 2-346 (2013); N.Y. CITY COUNCIL
INT. NO. 0857-2012 (as laid over by the Comm. on Civ. Rights, Apr. 11, 2013); WASH. D.C., H.R. 645
(as presented to the House Fin. Servs. Comm. on Feb. 13, 2013).
93
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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counterproductive work behaviors or applicants’ propensity to commit
fraud or theft,94 suspension of the practice may be warranted. Although
this policy response is blunt, it reflects the public’s and policymakers’
significant ambivalence about the merits of the practice.
In the long term, however, inquiry limits may be a suboptimal response
to the risk that employers will unfairly discriminate against applicants with
adverse financial histories. First, in their current form, state laws are
narrowly drafted and, as a result, make few changes to the status quo.
Thus, they advance few anti-discriminatory objectives. Even if, however,
state laws were drafted more broadly and were vigorously enforced,
inquiry limits cannot stem the flow of financial history information to
employers. As a result, inquiry limits cannot provide a sustained solution
to the threat of financial history discrimination in the employment setting.
A. Current Laws Advance Few Antidiscriminatory Objectives
A number of state laws restricting employers’ consideration of
financial history follow a similar template. The laws prohibit employers
from using credit reports to evaluate prospective employees95 unless one of
several exceptions applies. Employers may consult credit reports when,
for example, the employer is seeking to fill a position involving: (1)
managerial responsibility;96 (2) state government employment;97 (3) law
enforcement;98 (4) access to third parties’ personal or financial information
(e.g., social security numbers or credit card account information);99 (5) the
exercise of fiduciary responsibility (e.g., the power to issue payments,
collect debts, transfer money, or enter into contracts);100 (6) access to
confidential or proprietary information, including trade secrets;101 or (7)
access to cash.102
In their current form, these laws do not substantially change the status
quo or advance many normative goals articulated by legislators. First, the
94

See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
These state laws also generally prohibit employers from using credit reports to evaluate current
employees for promotion or retention. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(b)(1) (2012) (“An
employer shall not: (1) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit; discharge; or otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment
because of the individual’s credit report or credit history.”). The focus of this Article, however, is on
employers’ use of credit reports to evaluate those seeking to obtain a new job or enter a particular
profession.
96
See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(b)(4) (West Supp. 2013).
97
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013).
98
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(2)(c)(A)–(C) (2011).
99
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51tt(a)(4)(B) (2013).
100
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711(c)(2)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
101
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(7) (West Supp. 2013).
102
See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(b)(2) (West Supp. 2013) (permitting employers to
check a candidate’s credit history when the candidate would have access to more than $2,500 in cash).
95
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carveouts in the state statutes can be interpreted to encompass a large
percentage of jobs.103 In this way, state laws that restrict an employers’ use
of consumer reports merely codify existing Title VII disparate impact
jurisprudence.104 The bans prevent employers from using credit reports—a
practice that many have argued results in a disparate impact on protected
groups105—unless employers can establish that the practice is consistent
with business necessity. Just as courts have broadly interpreted “business
necessity” in plaintiffs’ Title VII challenges to employers’ consultation of
financial histories,106 state legislators have exempted broad categories of
jobs from the credit reporting restriction.
Second, in addition to the exemptions already in place, all of the state
laws (rather hypocritically) authorize employers to consider applicants’
credit reports when existing federal or state laws so require.107 As a result,
restrictions on credit report use can be easily circumvented.
Finally, these laws may be unable to effectively restrict employers’
access to financial history information, since the majority of these bans
attempt to suppress employers’ access to credit reports specifically, rather
than impose a general ban on employers’ access to all sources of financial
history information.108 Although credit reports are usually the primary
source from which employers learn about applicants’ financial histories,
employers may learn about applicants’ financial background through other
means. For example, information about bankruptcies, mortgage liens,
foreclosures, and tax liens appears in the public records.109 This adverse
103
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1714 (citing the broad interpretation of exempt categories in state
statutes).
104
See id. at 1766 (discussing state laws’ function of “entrench[ing] prevailing stereotypes” and
the legitimization of employer’s rights to access financial histories).
105
See, e.g., TRAUB, supra note 10, at Executive Summary (arguing that people of color are more
likely than others to report poor credit).
106
See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. United Va. Bank, No. 75-166-N, 1977 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13687, at *39 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 1977) (holding that a bank appropriately conducted
preemployment credit checks, since “the banking business is a fiduciary business . . . where there is a
good deal of cash openly handled”), aff’d, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980); Bailey v. DeBard, No. IP 74–
458–C, 1975 WL 227, at *17 (S.D. Ind. July 31, 1975) (holding that a state police department was
justified in using character investigations and credit checks to screen prospective police officers, since a
poor financial history might render police officers more vulnerable to the “criminal element”).
107
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (prohibiting employers
from discriminating against an individual who has opposed a forbidden practice in which the employer
has engaged); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 2012) (exempting employers from
prohibitions on credit history reports if federal or state law requires the reports).
108
For example, California’s law prohibits employers or prospective employers from consulting
applicants’ “consumer credit report” for employment purposes. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (West
Supp. 2013). It defines “[c]onsumer credit report” as a communication by a consumer credit reporting
agency of credit worthiness. Id. § 1024.5(c)(1).
109
See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 3.2.3.2, at 75 (discussing the location of the public
record information in consumer files); see also 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2012) (indicating that documents
filed in a bankruptcy case are public records). A court can seal bankruptcy documents containing trade
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information may also be revealed in local newspapers or via Google
searches, since some third-party websites include references to the public
records.111 Even search engines’ “autocomplete” functions may suggest—
correctly or incorrectly—that an applicant has filed for bankruptcy.112 An
employer might also learn about a job applicant’s bankruptcy or past-due
debts from the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship between the
employer and the applicant.113 In short, financial history information—like
other forms of personal information—has the capacity to infiltrate these
porous, legislatively-erected barriers.
These defects are a product of political compromises and narrow
drafting, but they may be correctible. For example, the laws could be
amended to encompass a larger array of positions and sources of financial
history information. In addition, legislators could increase these laws’
deterrent effect by providing applicants with a private right of action,
although it would be difficult for applicants to detect and prove violations.
Even if these laws were increased in breadth, however, the unraveling
problem, as I discuss below, poses a more serious challenge to states’
enforcement of financial history information bans.
B. A More Intractable Problem: The Risk of Game Theoretic Unraveling
Even if state bans were drafted more broadly to encompass a larger
percentage of jobs and more sources of financial history information,
attempts to restrict employers’ use of consumer reports face a more
intractable problem. Because the bans cannot prevent individuals from
voluntarily revealing their own financial history information, the bans may
trigger an “unraveling” of privacy.
secrets, defamatory information, or confidential information. Id. § 107(b)(1)–(2). Courts have only
sealed records in cases in which “‘the interest in secrecy outweighs the presumption’ in favor of
access.” In re Cont’l Airlines v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 150 B.R. 334, 340 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993)
(quoting In re Revco D.S., Inc., 1990 WL 269887, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 1990)).
110
If I File Bankruptcy, Will My Name Be in the Newspaper?, BRETT NASON: ATT’Y AT L.,
http://nasonlawfirm.com/archives/618 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (explaining that local newspapers
could print the names of consumer bankruptcy filers).
111
See, e.g., Ryan C. Wood, If I File Bankruptcy Will Everyone Find Out?, BAY AREA BANKR.
BUZZ, http://www.westcoastbk.com/blog/2012/02/if-i-file-bankruptcy-will-everyone-find-out/org (last
visited Sept. 27, 2013) (describing how Section 341 meetings of creditors may be disclosed by search
engines); DIRTSEARCH.ORG, http://www.dirtsearch.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (offering “One Stop
Free Public Records & Background Checking”).
112
Asher Moses, Australian Surgeon Sues Google over “Bankrupt” Auto-Complete, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/australiansurgeon-sues-google-over-bankrupt-autocomplete-20130122-2d480.html.
113
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1720 n.143 (citing In re Majewski, 310 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2002)
as an example of a hospital employee who was fired after he defaulted on his debts owed to the
hospital). Although In re Majewski addressed the firing of an existing employee rather than a refusal to
hire a new employee, an adverse financial history can conceivably reduce one’s appeal to employers at
any stage of the employment relationship.
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As Douglas Baird and Scott Peppet have argued, in situations where
asymmetric information exists between two parties, an individual who
holds favorable verifiable information has an incentive to reveal that
information to the uninformed party.114 In the employment setting, those
with the strongest financial histories—those that reflect no adverse events
like bankruptcy filings or debt-collection actions—will likely reveal their
financial history information to employers in order to gain a competitive
advantage.115 Because many employers regard financial history problems
as a reflection of irresponsibility or propensity to commit theft, an
applicant who discloses her strong financial history is more likely
(particularly in a lean job market) to secure a position and to command a
higher salary.116
If self-interested actors disclose their financial history information for
personal or economic gain, other applicants—including those with less
favorable financial histories—will in turn be compelled to make similar
disclosures, since those who fail to disclose will be penalized.117 If an
applicant fails to reveal her credit score or credit history, an employer will
infer that the applicant is withholding negative information.118 Faced with
the choice between disclosure and the stigma associated with failure to
disclose, an applicant will likely choose to reveal her financial history.
This chain of events is what scholars have referred to as “unraveling.”119
Evidence of unraveling is longstanding in the credit reporting context.
For decades, credit reporting agencies have collected and sorted
individuals’ personal financial information and made it easily accessible to
employers, insurers, and creditors. Employers, however, are subject to an
important inquiry restriction: they must secure applicants’ permission to
access consumer reports.120 Notwithstanding this limitation, job candidates
readily grant employers permission to view candidates’ reports,121 as
114
See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 15, at 91 (“Because the person who holds favorable verifiable
information has an incentive to reveal it, the allocation of the right or duty to inquire or disclose should
not affect whether verifiable information is revealed.”).
115
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1177 (“Simple self-interest will drive self-disclosure by those
with favorable private information.”).
116
See Glenn Curtis, Why Bad Credit Is Bad for Financial Careers, INVESTOPEDIA (May 27,
2012), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financialcareers/07/broker_credit.asp (discussing four
reasons why poor credit history may negatively impact a job applicant).
117
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1177 (“As signaling becomes more pervasive . . . disclosure may
become the norm across the economy. Keeping one’s personal prospectus private may become
suspect.”).
118
See id. at 1176–77 (discussing why someone with an adverse financial history may feel
compelled to disclose this information).
119
See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 15, at 91 (discussing the principle of unraveling).
120
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
121
See Desmond, supra note 9, at 909 (“[J]ob seekers and employees have little real choice about
whether or not to allow employers to obtain credit reports.”).
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failure to disclose this information may foreclose or complicate applicants’
pursuit of business and employment opportunities.122
I argue that as a result of two developments, the potential for
unraveling in the employment setting is growing more acute. First,
consumer-protection laws have gradually provided individuals with
increased access to the information in their credit reports, a shift that has
rendered financial history information more transferrable. Second, credit
reporting information has grown more accurate.
I discuss each
development in turn.
In 1970, in response to concerns that creditors, insurers, and employers
were using credit reporting information to make consequential, ex parte
decisions about consumers, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA).123 The FCRA provided consumers with a window into a
previously secretive, enigmatic credit reporting industry.124 As a result of
requirements imposed on credit reporting agencies, the contents of credit
reports—previously inaccessible to consumers—have become increasingly
transparent. For example, under the FCRA, consumers may request a copy
of their credit reports at any time and for any reason.125 In addition,
consumers who have suffered an adverse action (e.g., a denial of credit) by
an employer, insurer, or creditor are entitled to a free copy of their
report.126
In 2003, Congress expanded consumers’ right of access to their credit
reporting information. The FACTA amendments to the FCRA gave
consumers the right to request a free annual copy of their consumer report
from each of the three nationwide credit reporting agencies.127 Consumers
now can easily scrutinize their credit reports free of charge at
annualcreditreport.com, a website established by the Federal Trade
Commission.128 In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress further increased the transparency of

122
Shepard, supra note 9, at 1748 (“An applicant who refuses to submit to a financial history
screening likely effectively removes him or herself from consideration for the position . . . . The
contract is functionally adhesive. An individual’s choice is to ‘take or leave’ the employer’s terms—
and, thus, her chance at a job.”); Gallagher, supra note 9, at 1595 (arguing that requiring applicants to
authorize a credit report check is “virtually meaningless,” since employers can refuse to hire those who
fail to consent).
123
Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681x); see Shepard, supra note 9, at 1744–46 (discussing Congress’s reasons for passing the FCRA).
124
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1744–48 (discussing how the FCRA makes the credit reporting
process more transparent).
125
15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1).
126
Id. § 1681j(b).
127
Id. § 1681j(a)(1)(A).
128
See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 3.4.2.1, at 88 (outlining the process by which a
person can obtain his credit report).
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creditors’ decision-making processes and mandated that adverse action
notices include credit scores.129
Successfully suppressing unraveling in the employment context would
be challenging because these consumer protection laws have fostered
consumers’ access to their financial history information. Even if
employers were barred from viewing or using individuals’ credit histories,
consumers would still be expected to vet the contents of their reports for
credit purposes (for example, before applying for a mortgage). It would be
challenging to compartmentalize consumers’ access to their credit
reporting information, such that consumers are encouraged to access these
data in one context (credit) but discouraged from using this information in
another (employment).
Similarly, as long as legislators authorize the use of credit reports for
some positions but not others,130 attempts to restrict unraveling might be
ineffective, since applicants often apply for (or are considered for) more
than one position. An applicant could furnish his or her credit report for
one position, but, based in whole or in part on the strength of that report,
ultimately be hired for a position for which an employer is barred from
considering financial histories.
As Scott Peppet has noted, it is ironic that traditional initiatives to
increase individuals’ privacy—ones that have sought to provide individuals
with increased control over their personal information—are in fact
contributing to an erosion of individual privacy through the unraveling
process.131 By providing consumers with the “key” to their consumer
reports, consumer-protection laws have increased the likelihood that
consumers will very rationally share that key with employers, either to
(1) capitalize on positive credit histories, or (2) avoid the risk that
employers will penalize applicants for failing to disclose this
information.132
A second change is increasing the likelihood that, notwithstanding a
ban on employers’ use of credit reports, consumers will disclose their
financial history information to employers. Credit reporting information
has grown not only more accessible (and therefore more transferable), but
also more accurate.133
129
15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2)(A), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1100F, 124 Stat. 1376, 2112 (2010).
130
See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text.
131
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1158 (“[I]f individuals have control over their personal
information, that control is itself the undoing of their privacy.” (emphasis omitted)).
132
See, e.g., id. at 1158–59 (stating that individuals can be asked to “unlock the door to their
personal information,” and those who do not will “face new forms of economic discrimination”).
133
See Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Does the Fair Credit Reporting Act Promote Accurate
Credit Reporting? 3 (JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARV. U., 3 BABC 04-14, 2004), available
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/babc_04-14.pdf (concluding that it would
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Disclosure of personal information is only valuable to an uninformed
party to the extent that the information is verifiable.134 Thus, unraveling is
more likely to occur in situations in which employers can readily verify the
information that applicants disclose. Although consumer reporting
agencies like Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion continue to report a large
amount of inaccurate information,135 consumer reports’ overall legitimacy
is increasing, since consumers are now expected to play a greater role in
verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information in their
consumer reports.136 The same legal developments that have increased
consumers’ access to their consumer reports are, in effect, placing pressure
on consumers to regularly scrutinize their reports for errors and omissions.
Indeed, the task of verifying the accuracy and completeness of one’s credit
report is evolving into a routine component of a responsible adult’s
financial hygiene rituals, much like shredding one’s sensitive financial
documents, balancing one’s checkbook, or reviewing one’s monthly credit
card statement for errors.
A recent Federal Trade Commission study concluded that a significant
percentage of consumers identified errors on at least one of their three
credit reports.137 A portion of this group suffered a credit score decrease
that could affect the price of products like automobile loans and
automobile insurance.138 The subtitle of the FTC press release, however,
contained an important reminder and admonition: “Consumers Should
Check Their Credit Reports for Free Using AnnualCreditReport.com.”139
These two developments in credit reporting—increased accessibility
and increased legitimacy—are reflected in advances in information

“seem[] highly improbable” that Americans would be able to obtain “1) widespread access to credit
across the age and income spectrum, 2) relatively low interest rates on secured loans . . . , 3)
exceptionally broad access to open-end, unsecured credit card products, and 4) relatively low default
rates across all types of loans” if “the underlying credit reporting system was fraught with serious
errors”).
134
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1162 (explaining the costs borne by an economic actor seeking to
verify information).
135
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACTA, supra note 68, at i (“[W]e find that 26% of the 1,001
participants in the study [of credit report accuracy] identified at least one potentially material error on
at least one of their three credit reports.”).
136
See Zaki, supra note 3 (encouraging young job candidates to maximize their job prospects by
accessing their credit reports and improving their credit profiles). The author observes that “[o]nce
upon a time (when our parents were young), consumers didn’t have such easy access to information
about their own credit scores. What’s our excuse, now?” Id.
137
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACTA, supra note 68, at i.
138
Id. at v.
139
In FTC Study, Five Percent of Consumers Had Errors on Their Credit Reports that Could
Result in Less Favorable Terms for Loans, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/02/creditreport.shtm.
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140

technology.
In recent years, consumers have increasingly begun to
voluntarily share personal information—including financial history
information—through new business models and social media devices. For
example, Experian Connect, a credit reporting agency service, encourages
consumers to “[g]rant access [to consumer reports] to the people [they]
trust—like [their] landlord, [employer,] doctor, lawyer or financial
adviser.”141 Likewise, job applicants can voluntarily disclose verified
personal information to prospective employers using services like
MyBackgroundCheck.com.142 In competitive job markets, some applicants
have considered listing their favorable credit scores on their resumes.143 In
light of these trends, it is possible that candidates may eventually share
their credit scores on Facebook or LinkedIn profiles. Indeed, one
company, Credit Sesame, encourages creditworthy individuals to embed a
financial responsibility “badge” in their email signatures, on social media
websites, and on personal websites and profiles.144 Applicants could also
disclose to employers information that they have collected themselves via
Mint.com, Quicken, smartphone applications, or other financial
management tools.145
Thus, from the 1970s to the present, as a result of technological and
legal developments, credit reports have evolved from depersonalized,
error-ridden dossiers to more accessible, verifiable, and transferable
140
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1156 (discussing how “Big Data” developments reduce the
transaction costs associated with unraveling, since “individuals and firms can extract verified, highquality, low-cost data from each other directly rather than searching through [large quantities] of
unverified, low-quality information”).
141
See The Benefits of Experian Connect, EXPERIAN, https://connect.experian.com/index.html?ut
m_expid=67468160-63.8ZtNjEX3RNaUrDNeMPACTg.1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (stating that a
person can “grant access” to anyone they choose); see also Employment and Credit: Employer Access
to Your Credit Report, EXPERIAN, http://www.experian.com/credit-education/employment.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2013) (“Federal law allows potential and current employers to view a modified version
of your credit report for employment purposes such as hiring and promoting.”).
142
Peppet, supra note 15, at 1155; Employment Background Checks, MYBACKGROUNDCHECK.CO
M, http://mybackgroundcheck.com/employment_background_checks.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
This verification service assures job applicants that “[they are] in control,” because they can “look at
[their] background check,” “make sure it’s correct,” and “decide what information to share with
employers.” Employment Background Checks, supra.
143
See Samantha Nolan, Revisit Your Résumé to Ensure It Is “Cutting-Edge,” LADYBUG DESIGN
(Mar. 18, 2012), http://ladybug-design.com/blog/?p=495 (responding to “Dear Sam” letter in which
older employee asks whether he should include credit score on resume to improve his chances of
finding a job “in this dire economy”).
144
Press Release: Credit Sesame, Credit Sesame Launches Web’s First Credit Badge™ Program,
CREDIT SESAME (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.creditsesame.com/about/press/credit-sesame-launcheswebs-first-credit-badge-program/.
145
This problem, known as “self-surveillance,” has triggered novel privacy dilemmas. See
generally Kang et al., supra note 35, at 812, 823, 847 (recommending the creation of the Personal Data
Guardian, which would manage Privacy Data Vaults that store self-surveillance data, to counter the
novel privacy dilemmas created by self-surveillance).
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records that, as a result of consumers’ vetting processes, appear to bear
consumers’ imprimatur.146
These developments are decreasing the
transaction costs associated with unraveling.147
None of the current bans on employers’ use of consumer reports can
easily prevent individuals from sharing their personal financial
information. Likewise, it would be challenging to redraft the laws to
prevent unraveling, since prohibitions on individuals’ disclosure of their
credit reporting information might not withstand constitutional scrutiny.148
Even if applicants could be barred from sharing consumer reporting
information directly with employers (or even if employers could be trusted
not to use any formal credit reporting information), it would be more
difficult to prevent the disclosure and use of more subtle forms of financial
history data. Applicants can “signal” to employers the strength of their
financial backgrounds without formally revealing their actual credit
histories.149
For example, graduates of educational institutions could signal the
absence of student loan debt (and, therefore, the absence of any student
loan delinquencies) by disclosing that they received scholarships or other
subsidies that covered all or the vast majority of their educational
expenses. Without considering formal credit histories, employers could
rely on even more imprecise proxies for financial status, including (1) race
(minority applicants are more likely to have worse credit histories than are
non-minority applicants),150 (2) length of time at a particular address (a
recent move is more likely to indicate that the applicant has been evicted or
has suffered a foreclosure),151 (3) employment status (applicants who have
experienced a long period of unemployment are more likely to exhibit

146
Compare Shepard, supra note 9, at 1744, 1745 (explaining that the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting
Act was “designed to increase accuracy and privacy in the credit reporting industry” partly because
“[c]onsumers had [neither] access to their consumer reports” nor the ability to “correct incomplete,
irrelevant, or obsolete information”), with FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACTA, supra note 68, at 2
(discussing the consolidation of about 200 million consumers “into consumer reports and credit
reports” which can be analyzed and, thus, “enabl[ing] credit grantors” to quickly make “generally
reliable decisions” on whether to grant consumers credit).
147
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1191–92 (discussing how unraveling is limited by transactional
costs).
148
See id. at 1198–99 (finding it difficult to overcome the “constitutional and social objections”
raised to “prohibit individuals from sharing their personal information”).
149
See id. at 1162 (discussing that borrowers can simply state “I am a good credit risk—I will
repay my loans” without necessarily proving their credit worthiness as a signal to lenders).
150
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1730–31 (citing studies on credit scores that reveal disparities
between minorities and non-minorities).
151
See, e.g., id. at 1700–01 nn.23 & 26 (stating that consumer reports provide personal
information such as previous address and public record information including foreclosures).
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financial problems), (4) appearance (expensive clothing or accessories
might suggest that the applicant does not lack money),153 or
(5) membership in exclusive organizations (participation in particular
alumni groups, country clubs, fraternities or sororities, or even religious
organizations can signal wealth).154 While these criteria can serve as
signals for other, more obviously legitimate qualifications, they could be
used to make rough inferences about an applicant’s financial status.
Although unraveling may not be inevitable, it remains an acute risk in
an economy and society in which data analysis and aggregation complicate
For this reason,
traditional information-suppression initiatives.155
legislators must consider alternative methods to reduce the potential for
discrimination in the employment setting.
IV. INCREASING CONSUMERS’ PARTICIPATORY ROLE
IN EMPLOYERS’ ASSESSMENT PROCESSES
Currently, the processes by which employers use applicants’ credit
histories to make employment decisions is depersonalized and opaque.
Applicants may be aware that employers are utilizing their credit reports,156
but have little opportunity to respond to employers’ concerns about
problems revealed in those reports. Applicants may be unable to explain to
employers the complex circumstances that may have contributed to, for
example, a bankruptcy filing or a debt-collection action. Thus, as an
alternative to limiting employers’ inquiry into applicants’ credit history,
policymakers could take a more nuanced approach and mandate that
employers provide applicants with a greater participatory role in
employers’ assessment processes.
In this Part, I first evaluate employers’ ad hoc, informal attempts to
provide applicants with a greater voice in their evaluation processes:
152
See Knafo, supra note 12 (describing the “vicious cycle of debt and unemployment” in which
a bad credit report keeps a person unemployed, causing the person to incur greater debt during the
unemployment).
153
Expensive clothing or accessories could instead suggest profligacy, however.
154
Although there exists a correlation between income and credit history, the correlation is
imperfect. Compare Fumiko Hayashi & Joanna Stavins, Effects of Credit Scores on Consumer
Payment Choice 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 12-1, 2012),
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdp1201.pdf (“Older consumers and higherincome earners tend to have a higher credit score.”), with Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How
Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1271 (2009) (“Credit scores do
not exactly correlate with income, in that high-income borrowers may have low credit scores, and vice
versa, depending on their payment histories.”).
155
See Peppet, supra note 15, at 1176–77 (defining the “unraveling threat to privacy” concept as
the pervasiveness of signaling, creating circumstances in which people must disclose private
information to “avoid the stigma of keeping information secret”).
156
Before accessing an applicant’s credit report, an employer must clearly disclose that it has the
right to obtain a report for employment purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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employers’ current practice of providing certain applicants with the
opportunity to “explain” what factors contributed to their adverse financial
statuses (a right that I refer to as the “Mitigation Opportunity”). I then
consider how the Mitigation Opportunity could be formalized and
expanded, consistent with analogous rights consumers enjoy (1) under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act and (2) in the insurance scoring context.
A. Employers’ Current Practice:
Opportunity

An Informal, Ad Hoc Mitigation

Currently, some employers claim to provide select applicants with the
opportunity to “explain” adverse information in their consumer reports.157
As part of this “Mitigation Opportunity,” these employers claim to give
applicants a chance to describe what factors caused their financial
problems. These employers maintain that they take a more forgiving view
of financial problems triggered by divorces, separations, job layoffs, and
medical problems.158 In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, many
employers also claim to discount foreclosures.159
The Mitigation Opportunity seemingly allows employers to provide, at
least in limited cases, an individualized approach to an otherwise
bureaucratic and impersonal assessment method.160 By giving applicants a
chance to describe what circumstances contributed to their financial
plights, employers appear to treat applicants more as autonomous, unique
individuals, and recognize that applicants’ financial problems may have
been precipitated by unforeseeable, external factors.
Applicants’
opportunity to participate in and (ostensibly) to influence employers’
decision-making processes may enhance the perceived legitimacy and

157
See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 9 (reporting that sixty-five percent of employers
surveyed indicated that they would allow job candidates the opportunity to explain the results of their
consumer reports prior to making the decision of whether to hire them).
158
See Michael Eastman, Exec. Dir., Labor Law Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Statement
at the Meeting of the U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 23 (Oct. 20, 2010) [hereinafter EEOC,
Oct. 20 Meeting Tr.], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-20-10/transcript.cfm
(“Employers are much less likely to be concerned with a debt that arose as a result of a medical issue, a
period of unemployment or a divorce. On the other hand, some types of debt might raise red flags
more quickly such as gambling debt.”).
159
See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7 (reporting that only eleven percent of
employers surveyed indicated that a foreclosure would significantly impact their hiring decision).
160
In contrast, many perceive statistical evaluation methods—like credit scoring methodologies—
as impersonal and callous. See R.W. Johnson, Legal, Social, and Economic Issues in Implementing
Scoring in the United States, in READINGS IN CREDIT SCORING: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND
AIMS 5, 7 (Lyn C. Thomas, David B. Edelman & Jonathan N. Crook eds., 2004) (“As numerical rating
systems, credit scoring strikes consumers as dispassionate and highly impersonal. ‘Treat me as an
individual’, is the cry. Another aspect of the same, very natural concern is the admonition: ‘Don’t treat
me as just another member of a group’.”).
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161

fairness of the processes.
As Barbara Underwood has explained, “By
giving the applicant the opportunity to make a claim on the personal
attention of the decision-maker, [a decision-making] process demonstrates
a certain respect for the personal dignity of each applicant.”162 This
practice lends some credence to the “situationist” account of human
behavior endorsed by behavioral realists—an approach that recognizes that
“unseen or unappreciated influences within [individuals] and [in society]”
heavily influence individuals’ actions and circumstances.163
In its current form, however, this practice provides little protection to
applicants. Although it is unclear exactly how often and in what contexts
employers provide applicants with the right to explain the circumstances
that triggered their adverse financial statuses, this explanatory right is
likely provided relatively infrequently and on an ad hoc basis. Few
employers have the time or resources to scrutinize many applicants’ credit
histories in a one-on-one interview or conversation.164 Indeed, the greater
the number of applicants who are provided with this explanatory
opportunity, the less likely that employers can meaningfully and
thoughtfully consider each individual applicant’s explanations. 165
B. An Option for Legislators: Expanding the Mitigation Opportunity
These deficiencies could be addressed legislatively. To increase the
number of applicants who are given the opportunity to provide explanatory
statements to employers, policymakers could formalize and expand the
Mitigation Opportunity, consistent with analogous rights consumers
currently enjoy under the FCRA and in the insurance scoring context.
Currently, only select applicants are given the right to describe
mitigating factors to employers.166 This exchange of information occurs in
161
See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1427 (“Even if special pleading seldom affects the decision,
and even if it may slightly impair the accuracy of aggregate decisionmaking, it may nevertheless
enhance the perceived legitimacy of the process.”).
162
Id. at 1428.
163
Benforado & Hanson, supra note 21, at 314.
164
See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1424–25 (“A clinical system requires the careful exercise of
skilled judgment for the evaluation of each individual applicant, and therefore the marginal cost of
evaluating additional applicants tends to be high.”). Analogously, individualized assessment of
applicants in the lending setting is impractical and too costly. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 7
(“[I]ndividual treatment is unavailable, given the volume of applicants and scarcity of skilled analysts.
Even if such talent were available, it would be uneconomical for the credit grantor to provide the
service because the cost would be unacceptable to consumers.”).
165
See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1425 (noting that as the number of applicants increase, the
accuracy decreases due to the high marginal cost); cf. Gary G. Chandler & John Y. Coffman, A
Comparative Analysis of Empirical vs. Judgmental Credit Evaluation, J. R ETAIL B ANKING , Sept.
1979, at 15, 26 (“When dealing with large numbers of applicants, it is unlikely that judgmental
evaluation is able to deal with applicants as ‘individuals’ any better than can empirical evaluation.”).
166
See Shepard, supra note 9, at 1724 (“[S]ome employers claim to give some applicants an
opportunity to explain or justify bankruptcy filings or collection actions that appear on applicants’

1024

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:993

a potentially time-consuming, one-on-one interview or conversation with
an employer following the employer’s initial review of the applicant’s
file.167 If the Mitigation Opportunity were expanded consistent with
consumers’ existing rights under the FCRA, the timing, the form, and the
number of applicants provided an explanatory opportunity would change.
All applicants would have the opportunity to describe ex ante, in a brief
statement on consumer reports purchased by employers, what factors
contributed to applicants’ adverse financial statuses.
Under the FCRA, consumers are afforded numerous procedural rights
intended to increase credit reports’ accuracy and completeness.168 At any
time, a consumer may dispute the accuracy or completeness of information
in her consumer report.169 For example, a consumer might assert that an
account included on her report belongs to someone else170 or claim that a
payment listed as late was, in fact, paid on time.171 If, following an
investigation172 by the consumer reporting agency, the agency disagrees
with the consumer, and the dispute is not resolved to the consumer’s
satisfaction, a consumer who maintains her “innocence” has the
opportunity to insert in her credit report a brief statement explaining her
side of the story.173 This explanatory statement must be included in all
subsequent credit reports furnished to insurers, employers, and creditors.174
The investigation process—coupled with consumers’ right to insert
explanatory statements in their reports—attempts to strike a balance
between the competing interests of credit reporting agencies and
reports.”).
167
See Daniel Bortz, How to Convince a Prospective Employer to Overlook Poor Credit, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.money.usnews.com/money/personalfinance/articles/2012/12/14how-to-convince-a-prospective-employer-to-overlook-poor-credit
(providing tips for applicants on how to explain bad credit during conversations with prospective
employers).
168
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”); id. § 1681i (providing mechanisms for a consumer
to dispute the accuracy of information contained in a credit report).
169
Id. § 1681i(a)(1). After a consumer institutes a dispute, a consumer reporting agency must
conduct a “reasonable reinvestigation” to determine whether the disputed information is accurate. Id.
This process is known as a “reinvestigation” (rather than an “investigation”) because the consumer
reporting agency presumably observed quality-control procedures when it initially decided to include
the disputed information in the consumer’s report. WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 4.5.3.1, at
167.
170
See, e.g., Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 2012) (outlining facts
of a dispute in which a consumer disputed a car loan on his report and argued that his wife, from whom
he was separated, was solely responsible for repayment).
171
See, e.g., Paul v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1099 (D. Minn. 2011)
(presenting a situation in which a consumer disputed late payments in her credit report).
172
See supra note 169 (explaining that this process by which a consumer reporting agency
reviews disputed information is known as a “reinvestigation”).
173
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b).
174
Id. § 1681i(c).
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consumers. Congress recognized that credit reporting agencies, which
process vast amounts of information,175 will inevitably make some errors,
yet they cannot be exposed to excessive liability for inaccuracies. At the
same time, however, the FCRA’s drafters recognized that consumers must
have a meaningful participatory role in a decision-making process that can
heavily influence their access to employment, credit, and insurance. These
are resources that are indispensable to meaningful participation in the
American economy. The explanatory statement provides a relatively
efficient, inexpensive means by which consumers can highlight unresolved
problems in their reports.
Under the FCRA, however, consumers may dispute only discrete
objective facts on their consumer reports, like the precise balance of an
account or the accuracy of personal information (e.g., an inaccurate address
or employment history). Consumers do not have the right to explain what
extenuating circumstances contributed to a default or a bankruptcy.176
Thus, because employers scrutinizing an applicant’s financial history claim
to treat certain factors—like a job loss—as an extenuating circumstance,
the FCRA could be amended to allow all applicants to insert these
mitigating explanations in the employment reports purchased by
employers. Such a reform would provide all applicants—not just a
privileged few—with a participatory role in employers’ assessment
processes, without imposing excessive costs or constraints on employers.
This reform, however, is unlikely to benefit applicants. Regardless of
whether employers provide applicants with the opportunity to “explain”
their adverse financial histories in a one-on-one conversation or interview
or in a brief statement on their employment reports, this opportunity likely
constitutes a mere formality. Although many extenuating circumstances
cited by an applicant (e.g., a bankruptcy, a divorce, or a job loss) may be
verifiable, an employer may suspect that financial profligacy or poor
financial planning exacerbated the applicant’s financial difficulties. For
example, it may be unclear to an employer whether a bankruptcy or a debtcollection action triggered by a medical problem or a natural disaster was
precipitated by poor budgeting that left the applicant with too small of a
safety net.177 Thus, because applicants’ overall explanations are largely
175
See, e.g., WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 42, § 1.2.2, at 4–5 (“[Consumer reporting agencies]
receive from data furnishers approximately 4.5 billion updates on about 1.5 billion accounts for more
than 200 million consumer files each month.”).
176
16 C.F.R. § 611, item 4 (2011). The FTC’s Official Staff Commentary explains that a credit
reporting agency may—but need not—include such an explanation. Id. According to the FTC, “Most
creditors are aware that a variety of circumstances may render consumers unable to repay credit
obligations.” Id.
177
Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical Significance, but
Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 245–46 (2001).
Professor Jacoby explains this problem in the context of medical debt as follows:
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subjective and are not easily verified, they would likely carry little weight.
Rather, if an employer hires an applicant after considering the applicant’s
proffered explanations, the employer likely places little credence in credit
histories as an evaluative tool or the applicant has significant skills or
attributes that compensate for his or her suboptimal financial history.
In the latter case, the employer’s interpretation of an adverse financial
event may be influenced by confirmation bias. Confirmation bias causes
individuals to “frame newly acquired ambiguous or even contradictory
information . . . so as to make it consistent with information they acquired
earlier.”178 Because an applicant’s explanation for an adverse financial
event may be ambiguous, an employer may interpret the explanation in a
way that reinforces the employer’s expectations. As a result, the
explanatory opportunity will most likely not significantly impact an
employer’s decision-making process.
Policymakers could address the risk that employers might not seriously
heed candidates’ explanations by mandating that employers consider
applicants’ articulated mitigating factors. A similar reform was adopted in
the insurance industry. In some states, insurers—who use consumer
reports in the process of granting and pricing insurance policies179—are
statutorily required to consider whether debtors’ adverse financial
circumstances were caused by certain extraordinary life events, including
catastrophic illness, the death of a close family member, the involuntary
loss of employment, identity theft, or dissolution of marriage.180

One might challenge the assumption that medical-related filers are less culpable and
thus risky chapter 13 filers. After all, people with health problems are not
necessarily innocent victims of bad luck and insufficient safety nets. Putting aside
sensitive questions of whether these individuals engaged in activities or behavior
that increased their risk of illness or injury, American families tend to spend a lot
and save little. They generally fail to plan for the possibility of disability and
income interruption as well as they might, considering the probability of
experiencing these setbacks. Indeed, some might assert that the availability of
generous bankruptcy relief encourages consumers to under-insure. One could argue,
therefore, that the vulnerability of these families to medical-related financial distress
is partly self-inflicted and is simply a consequence of other spending and saving
decisions similar to those that debtors like Mr. Plastic made.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
178
RICHARD O. YOUNG, HOW AUDIENCES DECIDE: A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO BUSINESS
COMMUNICATION 207–08 (2011).
179
FED. T RADE C OMM’ N , INSURANCE , supra note 48, at 2.
180
Model Act Regarding Use of Credit Information in Personal Insurance, NAT’L CONF. INS.
LEGISLATORS 4–5 (2009), http://www.ncoil.org/Docs/CreditScoringModel.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2014). This Model Act—including the “extraordinary life circumstances” exception—has been
adopted by several states, including Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Connecticut. Sheila
Coolidge, Credit Scoring Use: Extraordinary Life Circumstances Exception Creates Added Consumer
Protection,
WOLTERS
KLUWER
COMPLIANCE
CORNER,
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Forcing employers to consider applicants’ explanations, however, may
be problematic. As discussed above, because applicants’ explanations may
not, in fact, be verifiable, employers may have difficulty making objective
distinctions among candidates. As a result, employers’ assessments may
decrease in accuracy.
Likewise, requiring employers to consider applicants’ explanations
might have a regressive impact. Because applicants’ explanations cannot
be easily or meaningfully differentiated on the merits, individuals who
furnish the most convincing explanations to employers are not necessarily
more deserving of an employer’s compassion. Rather, these individuals
may simply be more affluent, sophisticated, and financially literate. A
consumer who convincingly describes in her consumer report those
extenuating factors that contributed to her financial problems likely enjoys
several advantages that are correlated with wealth and education: she
possesses knowledge of her rights; enjoys ready access to her credit report
(and/or can afford a subscription to a credit-monitoring service); and has
the wherewithal to present a forceful, articulate explanation to a
prospective employer.181
Thus, expanding the Mitigation Opportunity would probably not
significantly benefit applicants, since such a reform is unlikely to change
the outcome of employment decisions. This reform, however, might
substantially advance employers’ interests. Giving applicants a greater
participatory role in employers’ evaluation processes functions to forestall
more stringent forms of regulation.
In recent years, employers’ consideration of financial histories in the
hiring process has generated vociferous protest. Indeed, consumers’ and
commentators’ opposition to the practice has triggered bans in several
states. Employers and employer advocates presumably recognize that this
regulatory shift—prompted by the public’s reservations about the
practice—can be delayed or forestalled if (1) employers can be portrayed
as empathetic and flexible, (2) consumers are told that they have a “voice”
in an otherwise depersonalized assessment process, and (3) it is clear that
only truly “undeserving” debtors will likely suffer discrimination.182 If
http://www.insurancecompliancecorner.com/credit-scoring-use-extraordinary-life-circumstancesexception-creates-added-consumer-protection/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
181
Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Mandatory Arbitration and Distributive Equity: An Essay on Access to
Justice 14–16 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 628,
Jan. 2013), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/628.obs_.access-revised.pdf (arguing
that mandatory disclosures create a regressive wealth transfer, since better-off and more sophisticated
consumers make better use of the information disclosed).
182
Cf. Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Economics, Law, and
Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485, 1507 (2004) (arguing that the “Over-Consumption Myth”—which
suggests that consumers’ financial distress is caused by their own profligacy—serves to forestall
regulation of creditors, because “if only the stupid or the venal are caught in a tangle of credit, then
there is no reason to restrict the lenders”).
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consumer anxieties are assuaged, consumers are less likely to complain to
legislators, and legislators are less likely to seek to fully enjoin the use of
credit reports in the hiring process.
A similar trend can be seen in the insurance scoring context. The
requirement in some states that insurers consider whether debtors’ adverse
financial circumstances were caused by certain extraordinary life events183
may have been prompted by insurers’ concerns that consumer discomfort
with the use of insurance scores would likely result in additional state bans
on the practice.184
For these reasons, expanding the Mitigation Opportunity would only
provide applicants with superficial protection against discrimination and
inequitable treatment. In addition, this reform would not improve the
accuracy of employers’ assessment procedures. Ironically, although giving
applicants a greater participatory role in employers’ evaluation processes
seemingly humanizes a bureaucratic and inflexible assessment method, it
may, in fact, increase the likelihood that applicants will be treated unfairly.
As a result, this Article considers whether an alternative approach—
encouraging employers to use financial history information as part of a
statistically sound evaluation method—can better address these important
shortcomings.
V. THE PROSPECT OF REDUCING DISCRIMINATION THROUGH
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION METHOD
Due to the deficiencies of the options discussed above—imposing
limits on employers’ inquiry into applicants’ credit history and increasing
consumers’ participatory role in employers’ assessment processes—this
Article considers an alternative approach. Although antidiscrimination
efforts have traditionally focused on suppressing consideration of
information, because bans may be impracticable, anti-discriminatory
objectives may be more readily advanced if employers adopted an
empirically derived, statistically sound evaluation method to scrutinize
applicants.
In Section A, I describe employers’ current subjective evaluation
method. Employers presently scrutinize the raw data on applicants’ reports
(i.e., lists of financial events, such as collection actions, defaults, and
183

See supra note 180 (outlining the states that adopted this requirement).
See, e.g., Property-Casualty Insurance Trades Support NCOIL Amendment to Its Model Law
on Credit, PROP. CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N AM. (July 14, 2009), http://www.pciaa.net/publish/web/
webpress.nsf/lookupwebcontent/71d4a6041319c96e862575f30077282?opendocument
(“Insurers
believe that [the ‘extraordinary life circumstances’ amendment] will provide necessary consumer
protections during a challenging economic climate while preserving insurers’ use of credit-based
insurance scoring, which remains a well-established underwriting and rating tool that continues to
benefit consumers.”).
184
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bankruptcy filings), from which they infer, based on intuition and past
experience, whether an applicant is likely to be a responsible, law-abiding
employee. I argue that this approach, which I analogize to the
“judgmental” evaluation methods used by most creditors before the
widespread adoption of credit scoring technologies, promotes
discrimination and stereotyping.
In Section B, I consider whether and to what extent policymakers can
reduce the potential for discrimination by adopting an empirical evaluation
method analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores and insurers’ use of
credit-based insurance scores. While this approach may perpetuate some
forms of discrimination (most notably disparate impact), it has the
potential to advance certain anti-discriminatory objectives not likely to be
achieved by bans on the use of financial history information, consumerempowerment techniques, or employers’ current assessment methods.
A. Employers’ Current Approach Promotes Discrimination
Currently, employers use only the raw data in consumer reports to
make assessments about job candidates. They consider applicants’
personal information, payment history, and public record information to
infer whether applicants possess certain personality traits relevant to work
performance.185 Employers do not use credit scores or any other statistical
evaluation methods.186
Employers’ assessments share a few commonalities. A recent survey
indicated that sixty-four percent of employers consider current outstanding
judgments when determining whether to extend a job offer.187 In addition,
less than three percent of employers claim to seriously consider educationrelated debt and medical debt.188
Excluding these categories, however, there are few consistencies
among employers in those criteria identified as most likely to impact
employment decisions. Half of employers consider accounts in debt
collection, one-quarter consider bankruptcy filings,189 and approximately
185
See Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7 (illustrating the factors that employers
consider when making hiring decisions).
186
See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text (explaining that credit reporting agencies do not
provide employers with credit scores or raw credit history data).
187
Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7. Employers were asked, “In general, if a credit
background check revealed information that presented the job candidate’s financial situation
negatively, what types of information are MOST likely to affect your decision to NOT extend a job
offer?” Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. Although the Bankruptcy Code contains several antidiscrimination provisions intended to
protect applicants and employees, 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b) (2012), almost all courts have interpreted
these provisions to authorize private—but not public—employers to refuse to hire bankruptcy filers.
See, e.g., Fiorani v. Caci, 192 B.R. 401, 407 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (“If a private employer is to be
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one-fifth of employers consider a high debt-to-income ratio very important
in scrutinizing applicants.190 These statistics are reproduced in Figure 1
below.
FIGURE 1
TYPES OF CREDIT REPORTING INFORMATION MOST LIKELY TO AFFECT AN
EMPLOYER’S DECISION NOT TO EXTEND A JOB OFFER191

These data suggest that employers’ conclusions may have a tendency
to be idiosyncratic.192 Employers are not necessarily consistent in
assessing outstanding judgments, collection actions, bankruptcy filings,
debt-to-income ratios, foreclosures, tax liens, education debt, and medical
debt. This observation reinforces the Vermont General Legislature’s

prohibited from refusing to hire an applicant because that person has filed for bankruptcy, Congress
must say so, which it as [sic] not yet done.”).
190
Background Checking, supra note 2, slide 7.
191
This figure is a reproduction based on information provided by the SHRM. Background
Checking, supra note 2, slide 7. Because employers were asked to select their top two choices, the total
percentage is greater than 100%. Id.
192
In the SHRM survey, employers were permitted to select the top two items of adverse
information that would most likely impact their decision not to hire a job candidate. Id. The
imposition of this restriction suggests that employers’ responses should reflect a greater degree of
convergence or overlap. As I discuss below, however, it is possible that the significant divergence in
employers’ responses reflects reasonable distinctions different employers make when filling different
positions.
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conclusion that “[t]here is no common standard among employers as to
how to interpret credit reports.”193
As a result, although employers appear generally to favor applicants
who are likely to have higher credit scores,194 employers probably weigh
the specific raw data in consumer reports differently. Some employers
may be more troubled about an applicant’s total debt load, based on a
concern that a larger debt-to-income ratio suggests that the applicant is
more likely to commit fraud or theft. Other employers may be more
apprehensive about an applicant’s record of debt repayment, regardless of
her overall debt load. For example, an applicant may have little debt (as a
result of a bankruptcy discharge or some other out-of-court settlement with
creditors), but the employer may nevertheless be concerned that the
applicant failed to fulfill his or her financial promises. In other words,
some employers may use financial history as a predictive tool, whereas
others may reward applicants on the basis of financial or ethical “merit.”195
There may be a fundamental tension between these two uses.
These data do not conclusively establish that these disparities in
employers’ approaches reflect irrational inconsistencies. It is possible that
employers’ emphasis on different adverse financial data is necessitated by
employers’ specific needs and the responsibilities involved in varying
positions. For example, an employer who recently suffered significant
embezzlement by an employee may be more attentive to an applicant’s
likelihood of committing fraud or theft, whereas another employer may be
more interested in screening for candidates’ overall responsibility levels.
The variables on which employers place the most weight need not
necessarily be consistent from employer to employer in order for the
methodology to be valid. The degree of variance in the criteria that
employers’ identify as the most important factors, however, coupled with
the dearth of empirical evidence supporting consideration of any particular
factor or factors,196 suggests that employers’ disparate approaches may be
more arbitrary than logical.
In many ways, employers’ seemingly idiosyncratic assessment
methods are analogous to the judgmental underwriting systems used by
193

2012 Vt. Acts & Resolves 556.
What’s in My FICO Score: How My FICO Score Is Calculated, MYFICO,
http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/WhatsInYourScore.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014)
(describing the extent to which certain categories of information are used in calculating a consumer’s
credit score). Consumers can improve their credit scores by, for example, reducing their debt loads and
paying their bills on time. How to Repair My Credit and Improve My FICO Credit Score, MYFICO,
http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/ImproveYourScore.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
195
See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1418 (comparing “criteria that purport to punish fault and
reward merit” with “predictive criteria” in the context of school admission and the release of convicted
criminals).
196
See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (describing flaws in the available studies of
employees’ financial situations).
194
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creditors before the widespread adoption of credit scores. Before advances
in credit scoring technologies in the 1970s and 1980s,197 credit decisions
were made “manually” by a loan officer at a financial institution.198 After
gathering certain financial information from a prospective borrower, a loan
officer would conclude whether an applicant possessed both the ability and
willingness to repay a loan based on the officer’s own prior experience and
the financial institution’s guidelines.199
Historically, creditors have lauded the judgmental approach for being
both personal and flexible.200 Like the Mitigation Opportunity that some
employers claim to provide to certain applicants, judgmental evaluation
methods appear to demonstrate a degree of respect for the personal dignity
of each applicant.201 A judgmental approach likewise maximizes creditor
autonomy by respecting a loan officer’s ability to make seemingly logical
distinctions among candidates, consistent with the financial institution’s
underlying goals and the loan officer’s experience with other borrowers.202
Judgmental underwriting, however, is inherently subjective. Decisions
rely on the “experience and human judgment of the individual [credit]
analyst.”203 According to one lender, judgmental underwriting reflects
“how [the decision-maker] feel[s] that day.”204 One bank president using
such an evaluation method explained that credit decisions could be based
in part on first impressions received from personally conversing with
prospective customers.205

197

FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4.
Id.
199
See, e.g., David C. Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 371, 373 (1978) (stating that credit officers look to an applicant’s ability and willingness to repay a
loan); Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s Specificity Requirement:
Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 B UFF. L. R EV. 73, 86 (1980) (discussing the subjective
evaluation system for deciding whether or not to grant credit).
200
See Taylor, supra note 199, at 102 (“Many creditors who use judgmental systems consider
informality and flexibility to be the system’s major assets.”).
201
See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1428 (“By giving the applicant the opportunity to make a
claim on the personal attention of the decisionmaker, a clinical decision process demonstrates a certain
respect for the personal dignity of each applicant.”).
202
See Taylor, supra note 199, at 86 (“The credit manager evaluates the character, capacity and
collateral of the applicant . . . [and] makes a professional judgment to grant or deny credit, relying in
part on his past experience . . . .”).
203
Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 17; see Hsia, supra note 199, at 372 (“Traditional
credit analysis uses human judgment to evaluate creditworthiness. Credit officers analyze incoming
applications in light of their own prior experience and their employer’s institutional guidelines.”).
204
Janet Sonntag, The Debate over Credit Scoring, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1995, at 46, 47
(quoting Ken Sacknoff, Director of Corporate Risk for GMAC Residential Funding Corporation).
205
Taylor, supra note 199, at 102.
198
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The subjective nature of the judgmental underwriting process
contributes to imprecise, inaccurate, and inconsistent decision making.206
Credit decisions may be affected by the loan officer’s “imperfect
recollection of past experience.”207 Likewise, one very negative or
troublesome incident may distort the loan officer’s future perception of a
particular applicant group.208 Even judgmental underwriting decisions
made within the same financial institution may be inconsistent, since
different loan officers may interpret the same credit risks differently.209 In
a judgmental underwriting system, it is difficult to institute clear guidelines
that can address many factual differences in consumers’ credit profiles.210
These defects are shared by employers’ current assessment methods.
Because employers—like loan officers relying on a judgmental
underwriting system—are permitted to act on hunches,211 employers may
be influenced less by analytical judgments than by heuristics, memories,
and past experience. The “availability heuristic,” for example, might
distort an employer’s recollection of past events. Pursuant to this mental
shortcut, individuals assess the probability of an event by the ease with
which such instances can be brought to mind.212 If, for example, an
employer attempts to predict whether a given applicant who has filed for
bankruptcy is likely to exhibit counterproductive work behaviors, her
conclusion may be unduly influenced by one salient past experience:
memories of one particular bankruptcy filer whom the employer had to
terminate on performance grounds.213 In other words, an employer’s past
“baggage” can diminish any predictive force of a judgmental evaluation
method.214
206
See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4 (“Both credit scoring
and judgmental underwriting tend to be opaque processes. . . . [M]ethods are not likely
consistent . . . .”).
207
Hsia, supra note 199, at 373.
208
Id.
209
See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4 (“In the case of
judgmental underwriting, methods are not likely consistent, even within a firm, because evaluators
differ in their experience and judgment about credit risk . . . .”).
210
Id.
211
See Taylor, supra note 199, at 102 (describing how credit managers can deny or grant credit
based on a “hunch,” even when the applicant would have been otherwise denied or accepted).
212
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974) (“There are situations in which people assess the frequency of
a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to
mind.”).
213
Cf. Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 19 (explaining that “generally, the focus of
information [in judgmental underwriting systems] is biased heavily toward bad accounts that have been
approved in the past as these are the exceptions brought to the attention of the lender”).
214
Commentators have made analogous arguments about law enforcement officers’ decisionmaking processes. See, e.g., Harold Baer, Jr., Got a Bad Feeling? Is that Enough? The Irrationality of
Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 91–92, 100 (2007) (arguing that “hunch-based investigative
approaches” used in the law enforcement setting may often be inaccurate, since police officers “face
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Furthermore, both judgmental underwriting systems and employers’
current subjective financial history assessment methods are problematic
from an antidiscrimination perspective, since both are likely to encourage
stereotyping by decision-makers. A significant body of psychological
research demonstrates that stereotyping is most likely to occur when the
evaluative criteria are ambiguous.215 This problem is exacerbated when the
information being interpreted is also open to interpretation.216
Under employers’ current assessment methods, decision-makers are
not required to commit in advance to any particular evaluative criteria or
method of weighing those criteria.217 Instead, the employer “is free to
respond to individual differences whose relevance was not anticipated by
any rule.”218 Although this flexibility may at times seem beneficial, since
it permits employers to give some borderline applicants the “benefit of the
doubt,” there is a significant risk that employers will act on negative
stereotypes about various protected groups. An employer, for example,
might be more inclined to reject the application of a minority applicant
with an adverse credit history based on stereotypes that African-Americans
or other minorities are more likely to default on loans,219 commit crimes,220
or exhibit irresponsibility.221 Recent research on implicit bias suggests that

hostile and frightening situations daily and consequently fall easy victim to unconscious feelings of
bias, prejudice, and the availability heuristic”).
215
Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 1049, 1050 (1991); Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit
Bias in Impression Formation: Associations Influence the Construal of Individuating Information, 33
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 573, 586 (2003); Ziva Kunda & Bonnie Sherman-Williams, Stereotypes and the
Construal of Individuating Information, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PYCHOL. BULL. 90, 91 (1993).
216
Fiske et al., supra note 215, at 1050.
217
See Underwood, supra note 34, at 1423 (“A clinical decisionmaker is not committed in
advance of decision to the factors that will be considered and the rule for combining them.”).
218
Id.
219
See Sara T. DeLoughy, Risk Versus Demographics in Subprime Mortgage Lending: Evidence
from Three Connecticut Cities, 45 J. REAL EST. FIN. ECON. 569, 585–86 (2012) (presenting evidence of
a positive association between subprime lending and minority borrowers); Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et
al., Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home Loan Pricing, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 110, 123 (2008) (“AfricanAmerican and Latino borrowers are more likely to receive higher-priced subprime credit than similarly
situated white borrowers.”).
220
See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398–99 (2007) (reporting that study participants consistently
recalled more facts suggestive of aggressiveness in fact patterns involving a character named
“Tyronne” than in fact patterns involving a character named “William”); Floyd D. Weatherspoon,
Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional
Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 447–49 (2004) (“Racial profiling due to stereotypical biases
also has a direct correlation to the high incarceration rate of African-American males . . . .”).
221
See James R. Kluegel, Trends in Whites’ Explanations of the Black-White Gap in
Socioeconomic Status, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 512, 523 (1990) (stating that whites believe the black-white
socioeconomic gap to be due to lack of education, ability, and motivation); Mark Peffley et al., Racial
Stereotypes and Whites’ Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime, 41 AM. J. POL.
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employers may render these assessments subconsciously, in the absence of
any affirmative discriminatory intent.222
B. How a Statistical Scoring System Could Reduce the Potential for
Discrimination
Instead of using the raw data in consumer reports to make subjective
assessments about applicants, employers could adopt an empirically based,
statistically sound evaluation method by applying existing credit-scoring
methodologies to employers’ assessment processes. Currently, creditors
use the raw data in credit reports to generate credit scores, or numeral
ratings of credit applicants’ creditworthiness.223 Similarly, insurers use
credit data to generate credit-based insurance scores, which they use to
predict the number or total cost of insurance claims that prospective
customers are likely to file.224 Employers could likewise apply a similar
methodology to the hiring process to predict the probability that an
applicant will, for example, commit theft or fraud in the workplace or
exhibit certain counterproductive work behaviors. In other words,
employers—like insurers and creditors—can use empirical methods to
measure their likelihood of suffering specific financial losses.
If employers used an empirically derived, statistically sound evaluation
method to scrutinize applicants, employers’ use of credit histories might
yield more consistent, less discriminatory results than they do presently. In
the subsections that follow, I examine the benefits and the drawbacks of
adopting a statistical method.
1.

An Employment Scoring Method Could Maximize Empirical
Soundness

An employment scoring system has the potential to counter the most
powerful critique of employers’ current evaluation methods: there exists
insufficient evidence establishing a correlation between applicants’ credit
history and traits relevant to job performance.225 Employers have long
SCI. 30, 35 (1997) (“[A] substantial proportion of whites agree[] that most blacks are lazy (31%),
irresponsible (20%), aggressive (50%), and lacking in discipline (60%).”).
222
See generally Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 750–59 (1995) (describing the psychological literature on
unconscious bias); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 145–46 (2004) (examining a study that began
research on implicit racial biases); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 969, 969–72 (2006) (discussing the Implicit Association Test for measuring implicit
bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493–94 (2005) (evaluating the
literature on implicit bias).
223
FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at S-1.
224
FED. T RADE C OMM’ N , INSURANCE , supra note 48, at 2.
225
See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (examining how studies do not establish a
correlation between applicants who have committed financial crimes and financial stress).
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relied primarily on anecdotal evidence to support their use of credit
histories.226 Consequently, employers remain vulnerable to criticisms that
they have been prematurely ejecting many qualified individuals from the
labor market, thereby undermining their own interests and prompting an
unfair post-recessionary reallocation of jobs.
A statistical scoring method would help ensure that employers consider
only those credit history variables that are related to characteristics relevant
to success in the workplace. Unlike employers’ current “judgmental”
assessment methods, a statistical approach would incorporate only those
credit history variables that are correlated at a statistically significant level
with certain discrete characteristics related to an applicant’s
(1) responsibility levels, or (2) propensity to commit theft.227 It would
exclude other irrelevant factors.
While it is difficult to predict what statistical correlations, if any,
would be revealed by an employment scoring model, a statistical approach
could test important hypotheses relevant to the normative debate about
employers’ use of financial history information. It is possible, for
example, that applicants with significant student loan debt may be more—
rather than less—likely to exhibit responsibility in the employment setting.
The acquisition of student loan debt can be perceived as a positive (albeit
increasingly precarious228) step that reflects a job applicant’s initiative and
a desire to improve his or her life standing. Indeed, a certain amount of
student loan debt may motivate prospective employees to be productive
members of society, thereby increasing their dependence on (and loyalty
to) particular employers. This theory—which might seem counterintuitive
to those employers concerned that any significant accumulation of debt
increases an applicant’s likelihood of committing fraud or theft229—could
be tested by a statistical evaluation method.
Likewise, a statistical approach could test whether an applicant who
has discharged a sizeable amount of debt in bankruptcy would be more or
less likely to exhibit irresponsibility or to commit fraud or theft than would
a similarly indebted applicant who has not filed for bankruptcy. A
bankruptcy discharge—by reducing an applicant’s overall debt load—
could conceivably reduce an applicant’s stress or distractedness level,
thereby permitting him to focus more diligently on his job responsibilities.

226
See Bernerth et al., supra note 74, at 469 (“Existing evidence in this regard is largely anecdotal
in nature, as practitioners contend that credit scores offer insight into an applicant’s character.”).
227
See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (“[E]mpirically derived scoring systems use
only information that is statistically related to credit risk.”).
228
See Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in Past Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2011, at A14 (reporting an 8.8% default rate on student loans).
229
Why Filing Bankruptcy Might Be the Worst Thing You Could Do for Your Career, supra note
6.
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Similarly, an employment scoring model could measure whether a
bankruptcy filer’s successful fulfillment of the terms of a Chapter 13 plan
increases his or her responsibility levels. Because completion of a Chapter
13 plan requires three to five years of diligent budgeting and repayment to
creditors,230 a statistical analysis might reveal that a successful Chapter 13
filer has learned important financial management skills that could translate
to success in the employment setting. Through statistical inference, an
employer could deduce that such an applicant has overcome adversity—a
trait that employers might covet in an employee.
It is, of course, unrealistic to suggest that the correlations revealed by
an employment scoring system would favor the opinions only of those who
support a reduced or more nuanced consideration of credit history
information by employers. Nevertheless, any counterintuitive findings
would require employers to adjust their current assumptions about the
relationship between financial distress and job performance—a
development that would, at the very least, increase the practice’s facial
validity and its accuracy.
These hypotheticals are oversimplified and reflect an analysis of only
one independent variable (one aspect of an applicant’s credit history, like a
bankruptcy filing) and one dependent variable (a particular adverse
outcome, like an increase in an applicant’s likelihood of stealing
customers’ personal or financial information). In reality, a statistical
system would allow employers, through multivariate analysis, to consider
Thus, an
the intercorrelation of many pieces of information.231
employment scoring method can interpret data more powerfully than can
employers using existing assessment methods.232 Employers who roughly
analyze the raw data in an applicant’s credit history to identify possible
correlations are substantially constrained, since they are limited in their

230
See, e.g., CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.25, at 105 (2009) (“In
chapter 13 the debtor retains his property and pays creditors pursuant to a court-approved plan over
three to five years.”); see also Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 4th
Edition, § 4.17, CH13ONLINE.COM, http://www.ch13online.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (arguing
that some debtors require “the control, regularity, and supervision of a Chapter 13 case,” because,
among other things, a Chapter 13 debtor “must learn to live within a budget and to make regular
payments to fund a plan,” an educational experience that often constitutes “the debtor’s first experience
with control of earning and spending habits”).
231
See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 21 (explaining how multivariate analysis allows
for the simultaneous consideration of a number of predictive factors, including age, income, residence,
and job tenure).
232
See id. (showing that an employment scoring model is more powerful than traditional
assessment methods because of the use of multivariate analysis, which more accurately weighs the
relevant factors in an employment decision).
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ability to simultaneously process many individual pieces of relevant
information.233
A statistical scoring method would impose on employers a more
rigorous standard than that applied by courts in Title VII challenges to the
use of credit scores in the hiring process.234 In several lawsuits, plaintiffs
have argued that employers’ use of credit scores—although a facially
neutral, seemingly benign practice—has a disproportionate adverse impact
on protected groups, including minorities.235 Employers, however, have
successfully averted these challenges, since courts have agreed that credit
report checks, although disproportionately affecting protected classes, are
both job-related and consistent with business necessity.236 For example,
according to one court, credit checks are justified in filling banking
positions, which involve the exercise of fiduciary responsibility and access
to substantial amounts of cash.237 Courts have not mandated, however, that
employers rely on known correlations between credit histories and those
personality traits relevant to job performance.238 Instead, courts have
effectively rubber-stamped employers’ unsubstantiated assessments of
business necessity.239 A statistical approach, in contrast, would help ensure
that employers consider credit histories only to the extent justified by
validated algorithms.
2. A Statistical Method Could Reduce the Likelihood of Intentional
Discrimination
Plaintiffs can successfully challenge an employment practice under
Title VII if they “demonstrate that the employer was motivated by racial or
233
See id. (explaining that a loan analyst cannot simultaneously analyze all information related to
creditworthiness because human decision-making powers are limited).
234
It has been relatively easy for employers to overcome Title VII challenges by asserting that the
use of a credit reports is consistent with business necessity. An employment scoring model, in contrast,
would require employers to show that a demonstrated correlation exists between adverse financial
histories and personality traits relevant to job performance. Compare Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n v. United Va. Bank, No. 75-166-N, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13587, at *39–40 (E.D. Va. Oct.
7, 1977) (holding that consideration of credit checks in filling bank positions is job related as business
necessity because the job involves handling money), aff’d, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), with Chandler
& Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (explaining that employment scoring models only consider
characteristics that are statistically related to credit risk, while a judgmental evaluation method might
cause individuals to subconsciously consider prohibited characteristics).
235
See, e.g., United Va. Bank, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13587, at *39–40 (evaluating a claim that
banks’ use of credit reports “disproportionately excluded blacks from [the] work force”).
236
See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining that courts have broadly interpreted
business necessity to include the practice of using credit reports in hiring decisions).
237
United Va. Bank, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13587, at *39–40.
238
See, e.g., id. (upholding the use of a credit check in the hiring of a bank employee absent any
showing of the statistical relevance of the practice).
239
See, e.g., id. (“It is not improper for a bank to check into the financial background of anyone
they are considering hiring . . . .”).
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other animus at the precise moment the adverse employment action was
taken.”240 In other words, employers are prohibited from deliberately
discriminating against an applicant because of his or her race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin.241 The likelihood of intentional discrimination
(known as “disparate treatment”)242 could be substantially reduced in a
statistical scoring system.
Under employers’ existing “judgmental” evaluation methods,243 it is
difficult to determine whether employers discriminated intentionally
against applicants, since it is difficult to deduce whether an employer
consciously or unconsciously considered a prohibited characteristic.244 As
I discuss above, stereotyping and subjectivity may impact employers’
decision-making processes because employers are free at any time to alter
the criteria by which they evaluate candidates’ financial histories, and it
may be difficult for employers to interpret the significance of certain
adverse financial events.245
If employers formally excluded prohibited criteria—like sex and
race—from an employment scoring model,246 then the likelihood of
employers discriminating against applicants because of applicants’
membership in a protected category would be substantially reduced.
Indeed, historically, some credit scoring advocates presumed that banks’
adoption of credit scoring methodologies would automatically insulate
these financial institutions from challenges under various
antidiscrimination and fair lending laws.247 They presumed that, at least in
240
Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005).
241
Title VII describes “an unlawful employment practice” as an employer’s (1) failure or refusal
to hire, or (2) discharge of any individual “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
242
See John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law: Slouching
Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709, 718 n.43 (2002) (explaining
how the disparate treatment proof structure is used to prove cases of intentional discrimination).
243
See supra Part V.A.
244
See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (discussing how difficult it is for loan officers
to eliminate biased decisions when they may consider prohibited characteristics either consciously or
unconsciously).
245
See supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text (explaining that stereotyping occurs when
employers are free to alter the evaluative criteria and as a result there is a “risk that employers will act
on negative stereotypes about various protected groups”).
246
See Chandler & Coffman, supra note 165, at 20 (explaining that an employer can comply with
restrictions against considering race or sex in employment decisions by simply excluding these
prohibited characteristics from an employment scoring model).
247
See Warren L. Dennis, Fair Lending and Credit Scoring, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1995, at
55, 56 (“[C]redit-scoring advocates point to credit-scoring systems as helpful to defend against
discrimination charges . . . .”). The same argument has been expressed more recently. See, e.g., FED.
RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-7 (“Some observers maintain that reliance on
automated credit-evaluation systems such as credit scoring serves to reduce the potential for
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theory, a statistical system is “‘blind’ to overt or subtle preconceptions
about racial or lifestyle factors.”248 Because the race and gender of an
applicant are “unknown to the personnel in a remote data processing
center,” decision-makers using credit scoring technologies appear
incapable of considering prohibited factors, like an applicant’s gender or
race.249
This perspective, however, is too sanguine and lacks nuance. Even if a
statistical method could reduce the risk of intentional discrimination by
employers, these benefits could easily be eclipsed by residual
discriminatory treatment in the hiring process. For example, any nondiscriminatory impact of an employment-scoring model could be negated
by an employer’s manual “override” of the preliminary decisions
suggested by an algorithm.250 If an employer’s algorithm were to yield a
negative employment “score,” thus suggesting that an applicant may pose a
substantial fraud or irresponsibility risk, an employer might discount these
results by providing certain applicants—or members of select groups—
with the “benefit of the doubt.” If an employer could selectively discount
the results of a statistical evaluation method, goals of accuracy and
nondiscrimination would be undermined. At that juncture, employers’
biases could easily be injected into the decision-making process. And
these biases, as cognitive psychologists have shown, are difficult to
suppress.251 Implicit biases may not even be known to the decisionmaker,252 and the effects of implicit bias are not currently actionable under
existing employment discrimination tests.253
The anti-discriminatory effects of a statistical methodology may be
compromised for another, related reason. Even if a statistical approach
could reduce the likelihood of deliberate discrimination by employers,
discrimination in lending because the automated nature of the process reduces the potential for bias to
influence lending outcomes.”).
248
Dennis, supra note 247, at 56.
249
Id. at 56–57.
250
Cf. FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-7 (explaining that disparate
treatment could arise in an otherwise nondiscriminatory credit scoring model if lenders “exercise
‘overrides’ for some populations or in some circumstances”).
251
See Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning, 7 TRENDS
IN COGNITIVE SCI. 454, 455 (2003) (“[T]he influence of prior beliefs is extremely difficult to
suppress . . . .”).
252
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1239 (1995) (“[There is
a] faulty assumption that disparate treatment discrimination necessarily manifests discriminatory
motive or intent . . . .”).
253
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“Unconscious bias . . . generates inequalities that our current
antidiscrimination law is not well equipped to solve.”); Krieger, supra note 252, at 1164 (arguing that
existing Title VII jurisprudence “is inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias
that Title VII was also intended to remedy”).
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credit histories are only one of several factors considered by employers.254
As a result, the anti-discriminatory impact of a statistical method may be
naturally limited by the strong probability that bias and animus may
infiltrate other aspects of an employer’s evaluation process.
Indeed, although the credit and insurance industries may have reduced
discrimination through the adoption of an empirical method,255 these same
gains may not be as achievable in the employment setting. In evaluating
applicants, insurers and creditors may rely on fewer non-credit criteria than
Employers rely heavily on various amorphous
do employers.256
qualifications, like a job candidate’s creativity, ambition, and amiability.257
As a result, it may be easier to maximize the anti-discriminatory benefits of
an empirical method in the insurance and credit settings than in the
employment market. The hiring process remains an imperfect science,
subject to decision-makers’ cognitive limitations. Because it is impossible
to sanitize all employment evaluation procedures, applicants must continue
to rely on rigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws to reduce the
risk of suffering inequitable treatment in the employment setting.
3. A Statistical Method Could Have a Disparate Impact, but Adverse
Effects Could Be Mitigated
While an employment scoring model is likely to reduce the risk that an
employer will deliberately discriminate against an applicant because of his
or her membership in a protected group, a statistical method may
nevertheless unintentionally discriminate against these individuals. If the
predictiveness of particular variables in the employment scoring model
254
See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About
Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 228 (explaining that subjective
factors also contribute to hiring decisions such as “interviewing presence” or “the strength of a
candidate’s references”).
255
See, e.g., Peter Zorn et al., Automated Underwriting and Lending Outcomes: The Effect of
Improved Mortgage Risk Assessment on Under-served Populations 15 (U.C. Berkeley Program on
Hous. & Urban Policy Conference Paper Series, Paper No. C01-008 2001), available at
http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/zorn.pdf (showing that manual underwriting approved only fiftyone percent of a sample of minority applicants for affordable loans, but Freddie Mac’s Loan Prospector
system approved seventy-nine percent); Letter from Nat’l Credit Union Admin. to Credit Unions (Aug.
1995), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Documents/LCU1995-174.pdf (“In general, the use
of a properly derived credit scoring system reduces the possibility that loan policies may be
discriminatory.”).
256
See Stanley D. Longhofer, Mortgage Scoring and the Myth of Overrides, COMMUNITIES &
BANKING, Fall 2002, at 18, 21, available at http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/c&b/2002/fall/CS5.pdf
(explaining that an applicant’s credit score is often the only factor considered in the underwriting of
credit card loans and other personal loans, but mortgage lenders typically rely on more than just a credit
score).
257
Judith Bartnoff, Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in “Upper Level” Jobs, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1614, 1630 (1973) (asserting that employers often consider “amorphous”
qualifications when filling positions for upper level employees).
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stems from the fact that they are serving as proxies for applicants’
membership in protected populations,258 a statistical method may have a
disparate impact on these groups.
Various studies, for example, have established that minorities are more
likely to have lower credit scores and insurance scores than nonminorities.259 Because employers’ algorithms would incorporate many of
the same variables utilized in creditors’ and insurers’ models, these adverse
outcomes are likely to persist in the employment setting.
The risk that an employment scoring model would disproportionately
impact minority or other groups is problematic, since employment
scores—like insurance scores or credit scores—impact the price and
availability of resources indispensable to meaningful participation in the
American economy. The purchase of insurance is necessary (and is often
legally mandated) to minimize liability and protect one’s financial
interests.260 Similarly, access to credit is required for wealth accumulation.
There are ways, however, to mitigate any adverse effect of
employment scores on protected groups. For example, the significant
disparity between minorities and non-minorities in credit scores may be
caused by credit bureaus’ historic failure to include in their credit scoring
algorithms “non-standard” sources of credit history information, including
utility payments, payday loan histories, and rental payments.261 Because
minorities are more likely to rent their homes262 and to use payday loans
instead of other credit products,263 the construction of the credit scoring
model may itself perpetuate racial inequality. If a statistical employment
258

FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-7 to O-8.
See id. at S-2 (“[O]n average, blacks and Hispanics have lower credit scores than non-Hispanic
whites and Asians . . . .”).
260
It is not uncommon that state laws require owners of cars to obtain car insurance. See John
Fund, HillaryCare Flops in California, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2007, at A10 (“California has had a law
mandating that drivers have car insurance since 1970 and has required physical proof of insurance to
register a car for a decade.”).
261
See, e.g., ALYS COHEN ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION §
6.4.2.2, at 137 (5th ed. 2009) (“Credit Scoring models often fail to include rent, utility, and other nonstandard payment histories . . . .”). Recently, however, some credit reporting agencies have begun
incorporating nontraditional sources of credit information in alternative credit scoring models. See,
e.g., id. (“[T]here have been several initiatives to establish ‘alternative’ credit profiles for populations
without a credit history . . . .”); Lenders Across Industries Validate FICO Expansion Score’s Power,
FICO (Feb. 2012), http://www.fico.com/en/FIResourcesLibrary/Lenders_Success_2249CS.pdf.
(describing the new Expansion Score and how it takes into account non-traditional credit data).
262
WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., RETHINKING RENTAL
HOUSING: EXPANDING THE ABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/fi
les/w04-11.pdf (indicating that renters tend to be younger, tend to have lower incomes, and are more
likely to be minorities or immigrants).
263
AMANDA LOGAN & CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHO BORROWS FROM
PAYDAY LENDERS?: AN ANALYSIS OF NEWLY AVAILABLE DATA 7 (2009), available at http://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/payday_lending.pdf.
259
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model were constructed to incorporate these nontraditional sources of data,
employers’ consideration of employment scores would be less likely to
have a disparate impact on traditionally disadvantaged populations.
Thus, while a statistical evaluation method cannot eliminate
discrimination, it can more easily detect (and ameliorate) unsound
statistical disparities among various groups. In contrast, judgmental
evaluation methods—in spite of their “flexible” façade264—cannot easily
be adjusted to minimize discriminatory outcomes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article highlighted an imminent problem facing state legislators,
who have sought to reduce the risk of inequitable, discriminatory treatment
in the employment setting by banning employers’ use of credit reports.
This Article argues that, even if bans reflect the most normatively palatable
solution to the risk of financial history discrimination, they are unlikely to
achieve their desired objectives. Because state bans contain exemptions
that can be broadly interpreted to encompass a large percentage of jobs,
these laws do little to advance anti-discriminatory policies. Likewise, even
if these bans were more expansively drafted and robustly enforced, the
game-theoretic “unraveling” problem would likely trigger a cascade of
information breaches that would thwart legislators’ efforts to suppress the
disclosure and use of credit-history information by employers.
Because the bans that the majority of states have adopted or are
considering adopting are likely to be ineffective, legislators must consider
other options. Policymakers could give consumers a greater participatory
role in employers’ assessment processes by giving consumers the
opportunity to insert explanatory statements in their consumer reports. In
these statements, consumers could explain any unforeseeable factors that
may have contributed to their financial predicaments. This approach,
however, elevates form over substance. It may serve to pacify consumers
by appearing to give them a greater say in an evaluation process that lacks
transparency and flexibility, but it is unlikely to have a significant impact
on employers’ decision-making processes.
Because of the shortcomings of these approaches, this Article
considers an alternative. Cognitive research suggests that employers’
current use of credit histories is likely to produce inconsistent and
subjective decision making—much like the “judgmental” underwriting
techniques used by creditors before the widespread adoption of credit
scores.265 If employers instead adopted an empirically derived, statistically
sound evaluation method—one analogous to creditors’ use of credit scores
264
265

See text accompanying supra note 200.
FED. RESERVE BD., CREDIT SCORING, supra note 27, at O-4.
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and insurers’ use of credit-based insurance scores—employers’ decisionmaking processes may grow less discriminatory, more accurate, and more
consistent. This approach would help ensure that employers consider
credit histories only to the extent justified by validated algorithms. In
addition, it would substantially reduce the risk that employers would
discriminate—consciously or subconsciously—against applicants because
of their membership in protected groups. While a statistical approach may
still have a disparate impact on minority communities, that adverse effect
could be mitigated through the proper construction of an employment
scoring model—one that incorporates “nontraditional” financial history
data that better reflect trends in minority groups’ financial practices.
A statistical evaluation method is not a panacea.
Its antidiscriminatory impact might be blunted by residual discriminatory
elements of employers’ evaluation processes. In addition, implementing
and constructing a valid and reliable algorithm (which requires significant
capital outlays and large, representative data sets) may be challenging.
The broader premise of this Article, however, is that a statistical approach
better addresses the realities of information diffusion and the inevitable,
disconcerting limitations of human decision-making. If credit reporting
information cannot be fully suppressed, legislators must be conscious of
how that data—notwithstanding the existence or the justifiability of bans—
is likely to be utilized by decision-makers, and how this information
infiltration may impair the fairness of hiring outcomes.
Promoting the adoption of a statistical approach may, at first glance,
seem counterintuitive to antidiscrimination advocates, since it fosters
employers’ access to information that advocates have dismissed as either
inadequately predictive or as patently unfair to use in the employment
setting.266 This Article argues, however, that the normative debate
surrounding employers’ use of credit histories is necessarily informed by
informational and cognitive realities and by the unprecedented challenges
that the burgeoning “Big Data” economy poses to antidiscrimination
initiatives.

266
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (citing employee advocacy groups as opposing employers’
use of credit reports based on a lack of conclusive studies).

